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First Impressions 
 The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by 
the Seton Hall Circuit Review members, of issues of first 
impression identified by a federal court of appeals opinion between 
April 1, 2005 and August 31, 2005.  This collection is organized 
by circuit. 
 Each summary presents the issue of first impression, a brief 
analysis and the court’s conclusion.  It is intended to give only the 
briefest synopsis of the first impression issue, not a comprehensive 
analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to being exhaustive, 
but will hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting 
point. 
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether software replicated abroad from a master 
version exported from the United States—with the intent that it be 
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replicated—may be deemed ‘supplied’ from the United States for 
purposes of [patent infringement].” Id. at 1369.  
ANALYSIS: In interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2005), a patent 
infringement statute attaching liability for supplying “in or from the 
United States all or substantial portion of the components of a patented 
invention” to “induce” the assembly of such components abroad, the 
Federal Circuit focused on congressional intent. Id. at 1371. The court 
stated, “Congress enacted § 271(f) in response to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) 
that exposed a loophole in § 271 that allowed potential infringers to 
avoid liability by manufacturing the components of patented products in 
the United States and then shipping them abroad for assembly.” Id. Here, 
Microsoft did not export components of an invention; it sent abroad one 
master version of software for mass reproduction. Id. at 1369. The court 
held that § 271(f) must be interpreted broadly to cover Microsoft’s 
actions because § 271(f) was enacted to expand § 271’s scope to any 
situation where foreign infringement is accommodated by acts occurring 
within the United States. Id. 1371. 
CONCLUSION: Thus, the court held, “For software ‘components,’ 
the act of copying is subsumed in the act of ‘supplying,’ such that 
sending a single copy abroad with the intent that it be replicated invokes 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) liability for those foreign made copies.” Id. at 1370. 
 
Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 
421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether § 117(c) of the Copyright Act shields an 
entity from liability for copyright infringement when a copy of software 
onto RAM is necessary for a machine to function. 
ANALYSIS: Although § 117(c) requires the immediate destruction 
of the copy made after “maintenance or repair” is completed, the term 
“maintenance” as defined in § 117(d) implies an ongoing process. Id. at 
1312. Thus, although a company may continually work with a system, it 
need not reboot and destroy the copy made until its maintenance contract 
has lapsed. Id. at 1312-13. Further, the copy is only allowed to be made 
if it is necessary for the machine to be turned on. Id. at 1314. If code 
designed for maintenance is so entangled with functional code, its 
copying is permitted by § 117(c). Id. at 1314. 
CONCLUSION: § 117(c) of the Copyright Act shields an entity from 
liability for copyright infringement when a copy of the software is made            
for maintenance purposes. See id. at 1312-15. 
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Wilson ex rel. Estate of Wilson v. United States, 405 F.3d 1002 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether defendant has jurisdiction to bring a claim in 
the United States Court of Federal Claims to recover payment made to 
Medicare on the grounds that the government’s claim against the estate 
was an illegal exaction. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that, although the Tucker Act 
allows a person to pursue a claim in the Court of Federal Claims for the 
recovery of monies paid to the government on the grounds that it was 
improperly paid, an illegal exaction claim may not be brought in the 
Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act “when ‘Congress has 
expressly placed jurisdiction elsewhere.’” Id. at 1009 (quoting 
Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 
1996)). The court stated that “‘all aspects of . . . claim[s] for benefits 
should be channeled first into the administrative process which Congress 
has provided for the determination of claims for benefits.’” Id. at 1012 
(quoting Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 605 (1984)). The court held 
that defendant’s claim is a benefits claim since she is effectively 
demanding recovery of an overpayment of benefits by Medicare and, 
therefore, the claim arises under the Medicare Act. Id. at 1013. The court 
noted consistencies in its ruling with two circuits. Id. at 1013-16. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the claim of illegal exaction was 
a benefits claim and, as such, arose under the Medicare Act, which 
required defendant to pursue the claim under the administrative and 
judicial channels of the Act. 
 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) 
QUESTION: “Whether the IRS was entitled to offset the erroneous 
interest paid to PG&E in 1988 against amounts due and owing PG&E on 
a subsequent refund relating to the same tax year when the government 
could not have maintained a suit for such erroneous interest due to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations.” Id. at 1378. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that a “tax deficiency, tax penalty, and 
deficiency interest . . . are all components of a taxpayer’s liability.” Id. at 
1382. “Therefore, these components are taken into account in 
determining whether an overpayment exists and permitting them to offset 
a claimed refund is logical.” Id. at 1383. However, “[s]tatutory interest is 
[not] a part of, or even related to a taxpayer’s tax liability.” Id. 
Significantly, the “tax code provides an integrated and comprehensive 
scheme for assessing, collecting, and refunding taxes, deficiency interest, 
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and penalties.” The court then stated that to permit an offset under these 
circumstances would go outside “this well-tailored statutory scheme.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court held that the “Service’s ability 
to offset erroneously paid statutory interest against a taxpayer’s refund 
claim in the same tax year is subject to the same statute of limitations 
that applies to suits by the United States to recover refunds of taxes or 
erroneous payments.” Id. at 1384. 
 
Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: Should a statute, which prohibits the marking of an 
unpatented product with the word “patent” for the purpose of deceiving 
the public, be interpreted as a strict liability statute requiring “all actual 
mismarking[s] to be subject to . . . [a] civil fine?” Id. at 1352. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the precedent of other circuits 
supported a finding that “where one ‘has an honest, though mistaken, 
belief that upon a proper construction it covers the article which he 
marks,’ the requisite intent to deceive the public would not be shown.” 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: Being that the statute itself called for the intent to 
deceive and that there were objective criteria in place for a court to find 
such intent, and based on the precedent of other circuits, the Federal 
Circuit held that the statute required a plaintiff to show “by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the party accused of false marking 
did not have a reasonable belief that the articles were properly marked.” 
Id. 
 
Harris Corp. v. Ericsson, Inc., 417 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether “it is permissible to use a blended royalty rate 
when all of the infringement for which damages are available took place 
after the lower rate would come into effect.” Id. at 1257. 
ANALYSIS: Relying on the court’s reasoning in Wang Laboratories 
v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1993), Harris argued that 
royalty rates used to establish damages are tied to the first date of 
infringement regardless of subsequent events. Id. Therefore, where the 
first infringement occurred in January 1992, the statutory damages period 
in which damages were available began and the royalty rates applicable 
in 1992 should be used to calculate damages. Id. On the other hand, 
Ericsson argued that under Wang the court could rely on subsequent 
events to the first infringement in determining the royalty rates used to 
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calculate damages. Id. Therefore, where Ericsson received notice of the 
patent in August 1998, the statutory damages period in which damages 
were available did not begin until August 1998, and the low royalty rate 
should apply. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that the district court 
correctly understood that Wang allowed for consideration of subsequent 
events, but was in error where it blended the royalty rate applicable 
during 1992-1997 and the low royalty rate applicable beginning in 
January 1997 to calculate damages. Id. The rate to apply is the one that 
would have been in effect during the period in which damages were 
available. Id. at 1258. In this case, damages would not have been 
available until August 1998, in which the low rate applied. Id. at 1258. 
 
Britton v. Office of Compliance, 412 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether 2 U.S.C. § 1406(a) and section 1.03 of the 
Office of Compliance’s Rules of Procedure mean that the thirty-day time 
limit for petitions for review of decisions of the Hearing Officer is 
measured from the date of entry of the decision or from the date the 
petitioner receives the decision.” Id. at 1328. 
ANALYSIS: The court, agreeing with the defendant Board, 
explained that “§ 1406(a) requires a petition for review to be filed a 
maximum of thirty days from ‘the date that the hearing officer’s decision 
is entered into the Office’s record’ not the date of ‘the service of a mailed 
notice or document on a person or party.’ By its clear language, section 
1.03(c)’s extensions of time apply to a different class of deadlines – 
those based on a party’s receipt of a document. They plainly do not . . . 
apply to ‘every prescribed period set forth in the statute and Procedural 
Rules.’ Furthermore, although the immediately preceding section 1.03(b) 
applies to ‘any action required or permitted under these rules,’ the Rules 
contain no suggestion that section 1.03(c) has the same scope.” Id. at 
1330. 
CONCLUSION: The court agreed with the Board’s interpretation of 
the applicable law and its resulting conclusion. Thus, it affirmed the 
Board’s dismissal. Id. 
 
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, LTD., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a sale of a patent-infringing method can occur 
in the United States, even if the actual method occurs outside the United 
States. Id. at 1318. 
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ANALYSIS: Research in Motion (RIM), makers of the Blackberry 
wireless email device, were sued for patent infringement by NTP, Inc., 
who patented the first wireless email system. Id. at 1288-89. NTP 
claimed under § 271(a) of the Patent Act that RIM’s use of a wireless 
email system infringed on its method patent, but the Federal Circuit 
reasoned that because RIM was located in Canada, the use of the method 
was beyond the reach of § 271(a). Id. at 1318. 
NTP then claimed that the sale of that method within the United 
States was enough, even though the method itself was beyond the Act’s 
reach. Id. The Federal Circuit disagreed because Congress intended that 
method claims could only be infringed by use, not sales.  However the 
court limited its holding to the facts of the case stating “we need not and 
do not hold that method claims may not be infringed under the ‘sells’ and 
offers to sell’ prongs of section 271(a).” Id. at 1320-21. 
CONCLUSION: RIM’s use of a patented method as a service to its 
customers cannot be considered selling of the method under §271(a). Id. 
at 1321. 
 
D.C. CIRCUIT 
Goldring v. Dist. of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act’s (“IDEA”) “fee-shifting provision enables a prevailing party to 
recover expert fees as part of his costs . . . .” Id. at 73. 
ANALYSIS: Parents of disabled children sued the District of 
Columbia Public Schools for violations of IDEA. Id. at 71. After being 
granted summary judgment, plaintiffs appealed in order to recover the 
costs of obtaining experts under § 1415, which allows the recovery of 
“reasonable attorney’s fees.” Id. The D.C. Circuit quoted the Supreme 
Court decision Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 
439 (1987), which found that “when a prevailing party seeks 
reimbursement for fees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court 
is bound by the limit of [section] 1821(b), absent contract or explicit 
statutory authority to the contrary.” Id. at 72. Analogizing Crawford, the 
D.C. Circuit found that there was no “explicit statutory authority” in the 
IDEA to lead to the conclusion that expert fees were recoverable costs. 
Id. at 73. 
CONCLUSION: The IDEA’s fee-shifting provision does not allow 
the prevailing party to recover expert fees as part of the award of 
attorneys’ fees. Id. at 71. 
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Booker v. Robert Half Int’l., 413 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether “enforcing the remainder of [an] arbitration 
clause contravenes the federal policy interest in ensuring the effective 
vindication of statutory rights” when the arbitration agreement contains a 
provision that “requires the claimant to forgo substantive rights.” Id. at 
79. 
ANALYSIS: Booker claimed that “responding to illegal provisions in 
arbitration agreements by judicially pruning them out leaves employers 
with every incentive to ‘overreach’ when drafting such agreements.” Id. 
at 84. The D.C. Circuit found that “[i]f illegality pervades the arbitration 
agreement such that only a disintegrated fragment would remain after 
hacking away the unenforceable parts . . . the judicial effort begins to 
look more like rewriting the contract than fulfilling the intent of the 
parties.” Id. at 84-85. In addition, the court stated, “the more the 
employer overreaches, the less likely a court will be able to sever the 
provisions and enforce the clause, a dynamic that creates incentives 
against the very overreaching Booker fears.” Id. at 85. “Not only does 
the agreement [under review] contain a severability clause, but Booker 
identifies only one discrete illegal provision in the agreement.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The D.C. Circuit concluded that “[t]he existence of 
an express severability clause in the agreement, the fact that the 
agreement is otherwise valid and enforceable, and a ‘healthy regard for 
the federal policy favoring arbitration,’ lead us to affirm the decision 
below, severing the ban on punitive damages and compelling 
arbitration.” Id. at 79. 
 
FIRST CIRCUIT 
United States v. Alvarez-Cuevas, 415 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the enhancement in [USSG] § 2A4.1(b)(6) 
applies when a fellow conspirator in the hostage taking has retained the 
taken child in his or her custody and the consideration received is no 
more than the conspirator’s expected share of the ransom.” Id. at 122. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit looked to the legislative history of the 
statute and found that the enhancement was “geared to the crime of 
kidnapping, not hostage taking.” Id. at 125-26. Additionally, the court 
reasoned that the enhancement “most easily fits a kidnap-for-hire 
situation,” where the kidnapper “never intends to return the child to her 
original home.” Id. at 126. Finally, the court found that an interpretation 
that would enhance the sentence of criminals, like the defendant, would 
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create an “incentive for kidnappers to hide or even to abandon children” 
to avoid the enhancement. Id. at 127. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit found that the enhancement in 
USSG § 2A4.1(b)(6) is not applicable “when a fellow conspirator in the 
hostage taking has retained the taken child in his or her custody and the 
consideration received is no more than the conspirator’s expected share 
of the ransom.” Id. at 122. 
 
United States v. Lawlor, 406 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a state trooper’s protective sweep of 
defendant’s house which was incident to his arrest immediately outside 
defendant’s house was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Maryland v. Buie, which held that an exception to the general rule that 
a search must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment exists where 
“articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from 
those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that 
the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the 
arrest scene.” Id. at 41 (quoting Maryalnd v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 
(1990)). Additionally, the search must be limited to ‘‘a cursory 
inspection of those spaces where a person may be found.’’ Id. (quoting 
Buie, 494 U.S. at 335). The court noted that Buie placed significance on 
“the risk of danger in the context of an arrest in the home” due to the 
possibility of third parties in the home. Id. (quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 
336). Accordingly, the court determined that an arrest immediately 
outside the home can pose the same threat. Id. Therefore, the court held 
that the officer’s entry and search of the home were cursory and 
reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Id. at 42. The court 
acknowledged that other circuits have allowed protective sweeps to be 
made in this fashion. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The protective sweep of defendant’s house was 
lawful under the Fourth Amendment since there existed the danger of a 
third person in the house and the search was cursory. 
 
In re Gitto Global Corp., 422 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: The issue facing the court was the proper and precise 
scope of 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(2), “which provides an exception to the rule 
of public access to papers filed in a bankruptcy case for material that is 
‘scandalous or defamatory’” Id. at 1. 
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ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit began by noting that § 107 “establishes 
a broad right of public access, subject only to limited exceptions set forth 
in the statute, to all papers filed in a bankruptcy case.” Id. at 3. In 
attempting to define “defamatory matter[s],” the court found the face of 
the statute and its legislative history failed to provide a sufficient 
definition, leaving the court “to determine the specific contours of the 
exception.” Id. at 11. In furtherance of the policy of § 107(a), the court 
held that “a party may seek protection under § 107(b)(2) based on 
potentially untrue information that would alter his reputation in the eyes 
of a reasonable person.” Id. at 12. Turning to “case law and . . . 
interpretation[s] of sources analogous to § 107(b)(2),” the 1st Circuit 
went on to find that protection could only be granted where it can be 
shown that the “information would . . . be irrelevant [or] included for 
improper ends.” Id. at 13-14. 
CONCLUSION: “To qualify for protection under the § 107(b)(2) 
exception for defamatory material, an interested party must show (1) that 
the material at issue would alter his reputation in the eyes of a reasonable 
person, and (2) that the material is untrue or that it is potentially untrue 
and irrelevant or included for an improper end.” Id. at 16. 
 
Belini v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 412 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether TILA [the Truth in Lending Act] permits a 
damages claim to be stated by the debtor under 15 U.S.C. § 1640 based 
on the creditor’s alleged failure to respond properly to the debtor’s notice 
of rescission.” Id. at 19. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit reviewed the relevant provisions of 
TILA as well as the purpose of that statute. TILA primarily requires 
disclosure. Id. at 25.  Although rescission is not a remedy for a TILA 
violation, it may be sought in an action along with actual damages and 
the statutory penalty. Id. at 24, n.2.  If a creditor has not disclosed 
necessary information, after the receipt of a valid notice of recission, that 
creditor has violated a disclosure requirement of TILA and is liable for 
damages pursuant to § 1640. Id. at 25. Furthermore, rescission is meant 
to be a private process. Id. “The potential for damages (including 
penalties and attorney’s fees) creates incentives for creditors to rescind 
mortgages when faced with valid requests without forcing debtors to 
resort to the courts, for such resort causes substantial delay and expense 
to debtors.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit concluded that TILA does permit a 
damages claim under § 1640 based on the creditor’s alleged failure to 
respond properly to the debtor’s notice of rescission.  Id. at 19.   
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United States v. Vazquez-Rivera, 407 F.3d 476 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: When a court violates a criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights through the mandatory application of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, is the proper remedy: (1) to remand for re-
sentencing, or (2) to solicit an advisory opinion from the judge in error 
regarding whether or not the judge’s mistaken belief about the mandatory 
application of the Guidelines affected the sentence the judge otherwise 
would have given to the defendant? Id. at 490 
ANALYSIS: In United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), the 
Supreme Court held in part that the imposition of a mandatory Federal 
Guidelines sentence made “on the basis of judge-found facts” was 
unconstitutional as a violation of a criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights. Id. at 489.  The 1st Circuit held that these cases are to 
be remanded for re-sentencing, so long as the government is unable to 
meet its burden showing that the error “did not affect the defendant’s 
substantial rights” beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit concluded that defendant’s 
constitutional rights had been violated and that the government had not 
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that this error did not affect 
defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 491.  The court then remanded for 
re-sentencing rather than following the advisory approached based on the 
court’s belief that there would not “be so many such cases that 
reconvening sentencing hearing will create a significant administrative 
burden.” Id.  
 
El Dia, Inc. v. P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 413 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a bond requirement for nonresident 
advertisers is a valid restriction on commercial speech under the 1st 
Amendment. Id. at 114. 
ANALYSIS: Dismissing other cases, the 1st Circuit stated that the 
framework set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), is the proper test to use when determining 
whether the bond requirements for nonresident advertisers impermissibly 
violates the advertiser’s First Amendment rights. Id. at 114. The 1st 
Circuit found that the Puerto Rico bond requirement fails the second and 
third prongs of the Central Hudson test. Id. at 115. The second prong 
states, “a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on 
commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real 
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and that its restrictions will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.” 
Id. at 115 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993)). The 
bond requirement also failed the third prong which requires that the 
“‘speech restrictions be narrowly drawn.’” Id. at 117 (quoting Central 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565). 
CONCLUSION: Under the test set forth in Central Hudson, a bond 
requirement restricting an advertiser’s commercial speech must 1) 
demonstrate that harms are real, 2) show that the restrictions will lessen 
those harms and 3) be narrowly tailored. In this case the bond 
requirement failed. Id. at 117-18. 
 
United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the combined sentence of years of 
imprisonment plus years of supervised release may exceed the statutory 
maximum number of years of imprisonment authorized by the 
substantive statute applicable to the crime of conviction.” Id. at 489. 
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit explained that a “sentence” in a broad 
sense of the term consists of several parts, including incarceration, fines, 
term of supervised release, or special monetary assessment. Id. Each part 
of the “sentence” is evaluated separately; therefore, the aggregate time in 
which the sentence is imposed on the guilty party may exceed the 
maximum number of years authorized for imprisonment. Id. The court 
followed the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits in this holding. Id. 
at 489-90. The 1st Circuit stated that “the permissible term of 
incarceration authorized for a supervised release violation is not 
circumscribed by the substantive sentence called for under the federal 
guidelines,” and therefore the sentence is upheld. Id. at 490. 
CONCLUSION: “When determining whether a sentence exceeds the 
maximum permissible under the Constitution, each aspect of the sentence 
must be analyzed separately.” Id. at 490. 
 
McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: When is it proper to apply the Lanham Act 
extraterritorially? Id. at 110. 
ANALYSIS: “Congress has little reason to assert jurisdiction over 
foreign defendants who are engaging in activities that have no substantial 
effect on the United States, and courts, absent an express statement from 
Congress, have no good reason to go further in such situations.” Id. at 
120. “[W]e first ask whether the defendant is an American citizen, and if 
he is not, then we use the substantial effects test as the sole touchstone to 
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determine jurisdiction.” Id. at 121. “The substantial effects test requires 
that there be evidence of impacts within the United States, and these 
impacts must be of a sufficient character and magnitude to give the 
United States a reasonably strong interest in the litigation.” Id. at 120. 
CONCLUSION: “We hold that the Lanham Act grants subject matter 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct by foreign defendants only 
where the conduct has a substantial effect on United States commerce. 
Absent a showing of such a substantial effect, at least as to foreign 
defendants, the court lacks jurisdiction over the Lanham Act claim.” Id. 
at 120. 
 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
United States v. Perez, 414 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defendant can be convicted of using a 
facility in interstate commerce with the intent that a murder-for-hire be 
committed when the defendant’s usage of that facility is wholly 
intrastate.” Id. at 303. 
ANALYSIS: The court pointed out that circuits are split on whether 
“the actual use by the defendant must be an interstate one” to support a 
finding that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1958(b)(2005) by “using a facility of 
interstate commerce” to commit murder-for-hire. Id. at 303-304. The 
court noted that the 5th and 7th Circuits hold that the statute is satisfied 
“irrespective of whether the particular usage in question was itself 
interstate or intrastate, so long as the facility is one involved in interstate 
commerce.” Id. at 304. On the other hand, the court pointed out that the 
6th Circuit held that an intrastate usage does not establish jurisdiction 
even where the facility used is an interstate one. Id. The court found the 
5th and 7th Circuits’ approach more consistent with the statutory 
language. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that a defendant can be 
convicted under § 1958(b) for using an interstate commerce facility to 
commit murder-for-hire in a totally intrastate fashion. See id. at 305. 
 
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the [National Bank Act] NBA and [the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency] OCC regulations preempt 
state banking laws concerning operating subsidiaries of nationally 
chartered banks.” Id at 309. 
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ANALYSIS: “The NBA grants powers to national banks, including 
‘incidental powers’ necessary to carry on the business of banking . . . and 
it provides that national banks, in the exercise of their powers, shall be 
free from state ‘visitorial’ power . . . . The OCC, meanwhile, has issued 
regulations allowing national banks to conduct business through an 
operating subsidiary . . . and providing that ‘State laws apply to national 
bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to 
the parent national bank . . . .’ These regulations define a national bank’s 
‘incidental powers’ to include conducting business through an operating 
subsidiary, and they preempt state visitorial power over operating 
subsidiaries to enable national banks to exercise this incidental power.” 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the NBA and OCC preempt state 
banking laws in this context and that the court will “defer to these 
regulations because they are reasonable within the OCC’s authority 
under the NBA.” Id. 
 
United States v. Jones, 415 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant’s state youthful offender 
adjudications can be used in determining whether the defendant is a 
Career Offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. Id. at 258 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit stated that “a defendant will be 
considered a ‘Career Offender’ under the Guidelines if the following 
three prongs are satisfied.” Id. at 260. First, was the defendant “at least 
eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant 
offense of conviction?” Id. Second, was “the instant offense of 
conviction” a “felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled 
substance offense?” Id. Third, does the defendant have “at least two prior 
felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense.” Id. 
The court defined a “prior felony conviction” as being “a prior 
adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by . . . 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Id. at 260-61. A 
conviction occurring before the age of eighteen can be deemed an adult 
conviction “if it is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of the 
jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted.” Id. at 261. The court 
also stated that “a federal sentencing court can consider youthful 
offender adjudications” in its deliberations for sentencing. Id. 
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CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court determined that it is proper to 
use youthful offender adjudications in determining the Career Offender 
status of the defendant. Id. at 256. 
 
Sepulveda v. Gonzalez, 407 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars the courts of 
appeals from reviewing orders from the Board of Immigration Appeals 
that denied a motion to reopen petitioner’s removal proceedings and an 
order which denied a motion to reconsider that order. 
ANALYSIS: The court introduced the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(B) (1996), which provides that ‘‘no court shall have 
jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of relief under 
section[s] . . . of this title.’’ Id. at 62 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). Despite the plain language, the court relied on 
precedent demonstrating the “‘strong presumption in favor of judicial 
review of administrative action.’” Id. (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 
289, 298 (2001)). The court also noted that its decision followed that of 
other circuits which similarly held that the statute does not bar judicial 
review. Id. at 63. Finally, the court followed a principal that “because a 
final order of removal is intertwined with subsequent motions to 
reconsider and reopen those removal proceedings, a jurisdictional 
provision that applies to a final order of removal necessarily [] applies to 
related motions to reconsider and reopen.” Id. at 64. Accordingly, the 
court held that judicial review of these orders was proper. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) 
does not prohibit [the] [c]ourt from reviewing [the] orders because the 
determinations to deny [petitioner] eligibility for relief under §§ 1229b 
and 1255(i) were nondiscretionary.” Id. at 61. 
 
In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192 (2d. Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether unpaid contributions are ‘assets’ of an 
ERISA plan.” Id. at 1198. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked at the plain meaning of the word 
“asset” which revealed that the central point of the definition is that “the 
person or entity holding the asset has an ownership interest in a given 
thing, whether tangible or intangible.” Id. at 1199. Next, in determining 
ownership interests, the court looked at common law property principles 
and held that a future interest exists in the plan “in the collection of the 
contractually-owed contributions.” Id. Under the First Restatement, “a 
future interest in property is “‘an interest . . . which is not, but may 
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become a present interest.’” Id. (quoting Restatement (First) of Property 
§ 153(1)(a) (1936)). In this particular case, the court held that the 
contractual interest to collect the unpaid contributions represents a future 
interest in the plan and, by application of the Restatement, qualifies as a 
present interest. Id. Therefore, the unpaid contributions are “assets” of 
the ERISA plan. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the contractual right to collect 
unpaid contributions represents a present interest in the plan and, 
therefore, qualifies as an “asset” of an ERISA plan. 
 
In re Siemon, 421 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the time limit imposed by Rule 8002(a) [of 
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure] is in fact jurisdictional . . . .” 
Id. at 169.   
ANALYSIS: Answering in the affirmative, the 2nd Circuit cited 
three reasons in support of its decision. First, the court pointed to a 
number of district court cases that had treated the rule as jurisdictional. 
Id. Second, the court cited sister courts that had come to the same 
determination. Id. Finally, the court noted that “[t]he advisory 
committee’s note to Rule 8002(a) states that the rule is an ‘adaptation’ of 
Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure [and that] it is . . . 
well established that the time limit prescribed by [Rule] 4(a) is 
‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’” Id. (citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court followed its “sister circuits in 
holding that the time limit contained in Rule 8002(a) is jurisdictional, 
and that, in the absence of a timely notice of appeal in the district court, 
the district court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal, regardless 
of whether the appellant can demonstrate ‘excusable neglect.’” Id. 
 
Cross v. New York City Transit Auth., 417 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether public employers are exempt from the 
liquidated damages provision of the ADEA [Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act].” Id. at 254. 
ANALYSIS: The court followed the 3rd Circuit reasoning on this 
issue by noting that “the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge’ an individual because of his or her 
age.” Id. at 255. The court found that “[b]ecause state and municipal 
entities are expressly included within the ADEA definition of an 
‘employer,’… the statute ‘could not be more explicit in imposing 
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liability for age discrimination against municipalities’ and agencies 
thereof.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded “that the plaintiffs have a right 
to recover liquidated damages for this willful discrimination from the 
Transit Authority because the ADEA authorizes such damages against 
public as well as private employers.” Id. at 259. 
 
605 Park Garage Assoc., LLC v. 605 Apartment Corp., 412 F.3d 304 
(2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a cooperative may terminate a lease entered 
into by a sponsor (or its affiliate) prior to the [the Condominium and 
Cooperative Conversion Protection and Abuse] Relief Act’s effective 
date, where two lease renewal options contained in that lease were 
exercised after the Act’s effective date.” Id. at 305. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that “[s]ince the exercise of a lease 
renewal option does not create a new lease under New York law, and 
since the Garage Lease was executed before October 8, 1980, the plain 
language of the Relief Act dictates that the Garage Lease may not be 
terminated under that Act.” Id. at 306. “Moreover, application of the 
Relief Act in the manner the Cooperative urges would implicate 
retroactivity concerns.” Id. (citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The court asserted that “federal courts will apply a 
statute retroactively only where provided with a clear articulation of 
congressional intent, which is lacking here.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, 
the court held that the Relief Act provided no such termination right and 
affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of the sponsor. Id. at 305-06. 
 
United States v. Weisser, 417 F.3d 336 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether § 2G2.2 of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, providing for a computer-use enhancement if “a computer 
was used for the transmission of the material,” applies to an individual 
whose act of transporting for which he has been convicted entails 
physically carrying a CD from one state to another, “an act that 
concededly [does] not involve the use of a computer.” Id. at 349. 
ANALYSIS: Finding a recent 3rd Circuit ruling on this issue 
persuasive, the 2nd Circuit agreed with the 3rd Circuit’s assertion that 
“[t]he language of § 2G2.2(b)(5) is specifically targeted toward ‘the 
material’ and not ‘the offense,’ as are other portions of § 2G2.2. The 
application of the enhancement, therefore, does not hinge on whether the 
defendant used a computer to commit ‘the offense’ for which he was 
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convicted. Instead, the enhancement hinges on ‘the material’ implicated 
in the offense, and whether this material had at some point been 
transmitted using a computer.” Id. (quoting United States v. Harrison, 
357 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2004)). The court also found that policy reasons 
strongly favor application of the enhancement. Id. The court articulated 
that “[a]pplication of the enhancement where a computer was used in 
transmitting the pornographic materials underlying the offense . . . serves 
to punish more severely what has been recognized as more dangerous 
behavior.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Accordingly, the court found that the lower court 
had properly applied § 2G2.2 “to the act of transporting a CD whose 
manner of creation – downloading – involved ‘use of a computer.’” Id. 
 
United States v. Amante, 418 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a district court may bifurcate a single-count 
felon-in-possession trial absent the government’s consent.” Id. at 222. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that a “bifurcation order…presents 
the problem of forcing the jury to deliberate about the issue of 
ammunition possession without knowing that the charged crime requires 
a prior felony.” Id. at 224. In addition, the 1st, 4th, and 9th Circuits have 
prohibited trial courts from bifurcating the elements of a single-count 
felon-in-possession at trial. Id. at 223-24. 
CONCLUSION: “[W]e hold that bifurcation of the elements of a 
single-count felon-in-possession trial, absent the government’s consent, 
is generally error.” Id. at 224. 
 
Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: In cases brought under the Equal Access to Justice Act 
(“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, “whether a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus challenging an immigration detention qualifies as a ‘civil 
action.’” Id. at 664. 
ANALYSIS: In Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107 (2d. Cir. 1984), 
the 2nd Circuit had held that habeas petitions did not qualify as a “civil 
action” under the EAJA. Id. at 667. The 2nd Circuit had recognized that 
in enacting the EAJA, Congress was concerned where “the cost of 
contesting a Government order, for example, exceeds the amount at 
stake, a party has no realistic choice and no effective remedy.” Id. at 669-
670 (internal citations omitted). However, immigration habeas 
challenges can be distinguished in part because “unlike criminal 
defendants, persons in immigration proceedings are not provided with 
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legal counsel.” Id. at 670. Finally, “the EAJA’s purpose of providing 
financial encouragement to litigants is not sufficient to demonstrate that 
Congress’s intent was to exclude habeas petitions in the immigration 
context from the term ‘civil action[s].’” Id. at 671. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that “a habeas proceeding 
challenging immigration detentions constitutes a “civil action” under the 
EAJA.” Id. at 672. 
 
In re Simon II Litigation, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a court may certify “a mandatory, stand-alone 
punitive damages class on the proposed ‘limited punishment’ theory” Id. 
at 132. 
ANALYSIS: The limited punishment theory is premised on the idea 
that “there is a constitutional due process limitation on the total amount 
of punitive damages that may be assessed against a defendant for the 
same offending conduct.” Id. at 134. It is the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment which supplies this cap by prohibiting the 
“‘imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a 
tortfeasor.’” Id. at 135. Theory aside, the 2nd Circuit noted that there are 
definite conditions that must be satisfied in order to justify binding 
absent class members. Id. at 137. The court stated that these conditions 
were: “‘a fund with a definitely ascertainable limit, all of which would be 
distributed to satisfy all those with liquidated claims based on a common 
theory of liability, by an equitable, pro rata distribution.’” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Since the proposed cap under the ‘limited 
punishment’ theory was merely theoretical, capped by the uncertain 
boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the court 
held that the amount of the fund under such a theory was not definitely 
ascertainable; and thus, the theory could not be used by a court to certify 
a mandatory punitive damages class. Id. at 138-40. 
 
Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 409 F.3d 506 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether there is an exception to the rule that an action 
sought to be enjoined is moot if the event at issue occurs. Id. at 509. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit explained that normally “the 
occurrence of an action sought to be enjoined . . . moots the request for 
preliminary injunctive relief because [the] Court has ‘no effective relief 
to offer’ once the action has occurred.” Id. (quoting CMM Cable Rep., 
Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 48 F.3d 618, 621 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
However, the court stated that if there is a situation in which the court 
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can still grant effective relief by placing the parties back in the same 
situation that they were in before the action occurred, the case is no 
longer moot. Id. at 510. 
CONCLUSION: If effective relief can still be granted by returning 
the parties to the status quo before the action occurred then the case is 
not moot and the court still has jurisdiction. Id. 
 
Lin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 416 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether an Immigration Judge’s interpretation of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), which has been affirmed 
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), is entitled to a deferential 
standard of review under the Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
ANALYSIS: The BIA previously ruled that the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) provides 
asylum for victims, or their spouses, of coercive family planning 
policies. Id. at 186. The BIA, however, affirmed the decisions of 
Immigration Judges (“IJ”) who denied asylum to the boyfriends and 
fiancés of victims. Id. Before ruling on the facts, the 2nd Circuit 
discussed whether those decisions should be afforded deference.  It ruled 
that the decisions should not because “were we to accord Chevron 
deference to non-binding IJ statutory interpretations, we could find 
ourselves in the impossible position of having to uphold as reasonable on 
Tuesday one construction that is completely antithetical to another 
construction we had affirmed as reasonable the Monday before.” Id. at 
190. 
CONCLUSION: “There is no reason to believe that an IJ’s summarily 
affirmed decision contains the sort of authoritative and considered 
statutory construction that Chevron deference was designed to honor.” 
Id. at 191. 
 
Wilson v. McGinnis, 413 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, prior to entering a guilty plea, a state 
defendant must be informed that his sentence in state custody must be 
served consecutively to, rather than concurrently with, a previously 
imposed undischarged state sentence.” Id. at 198. 
ANALYSIS: Wilson, a convicted felon, pled guilty to a charge of 
attempted robbery in the second degree and was told by the court “that 
he faced a term of 12 years to life.” Id. at 197. Later, Wilson moved to 
withdraw his plea.  He argued that his plea was not voluntary and 
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intelligent because he was not informed that the sentence may run 
consecutive to a prior conviction until after he entered his plea. Id. 
Federal circuit courts have previously held that “federal courts need not 
warn defendants prior to the entry of a plea that their federal sentences 
may run consecutively to their state sentences.” Id. at 199. The court 
reasoned that Wilson was informed at his plea “that the court intended to 
sentence him to a prison term of 12 years to life, and that is precisely the 
sentence that the court imposed.” Id. at 200. Additionally, the sentencing 
court retained “discretion to impose a concurrent sentence if it 
determine[d] that such a sentence would be ‘in the interest of justice,’” 
but chose instead to implement consecutive sentences. Id. The court 
found “that the prevailing rule that imposition of a federal sentence to 
run consecutively to a state sentence is a collateral consequence of a plea 
[that] may reasonably be extended to apply to imposition of consecutive 
state sentences.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the state court’s failure to 
inform Wilson at the time he pled guilty that he could receive a 
consecutive sentence did not unreasonably apply the general principle of 
Supreme Court law that a plea must be knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary to be valid.” Id. at 200. 
 
United States v. Rowe, 414 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hat a proper venue is for an 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c) 
prosecution.” Id. at 277. 
ANALYSIS: The defendant appealed from a conviction “of 
advertising to receive, exchange or distribute child pornography in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c) (now designated § 2251(d)).” Id. at 272. 
In “determining the suitability of a particular venue, [a court] ‘must 
initially identify the conduct constituting the offense (the nature of the 
crime) and then discern the location of the commission of the criminal 
acts.’” Id. at 278. The court found that the defendant’s acts “consist[] of 
distinct parts which have different localities [that] may be tried where 
any part can be proved to have been done.” Id. at 278. Although the 
defendant posted to a chat room from his home in Kentucky, because the 
posting was seen by an investigator in New York, the 2nd Circuit found 
that the defendant’s conduct “nevertheless amounted to a continuing 
offense committed in New York.” Id. at 279. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “‘venue is proper, both 
under the Constitution and under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, in any district in which such offense was begun, continued or 
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completed.’”  Therefore, in this case, the Southern District of New York 
was a proper venue. Id. at 274. 
 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
Morris v. Rumsfeld, 420 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, when pursuing an employment 
discrimination claim in federal court, a federal employee may elect to 
enforce only the liability determination of an EEOC ruling, while 
seeking a de novo jury trial on the question of damages.” Id. at 289-90. 
ANALYSIS: The plaintiff’s suit was founded on 42 U.S.C. § 200-e-
16(c) which has been interpreted by the courts as requiring a trial de 
novo. Id. at 292 (citing Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976). 
The court looked to other circuit, which held that while administrative 
finds are admissible as evidence, they are not binding on the district 
courts. Id. at 293. 
CONCLUSION: “We hold that, when a federal employee comes to 
court to challenge, in whole or in part, the administrative disposition of 
his or her discrimination claims, the court must consider those claims de 
novo, and is not bound by the results of the administrative process, 
whether that process culminated in one administrative decision, or in two 
or more decisions.” Id. at 294. 
 
Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a District Court should abstain from a 
Hague Convention Petition when a state court custody proceeding is 
pending.” Id. at 202. 
ANALYSIS: “It is clear that if the state proceeding is one in which 
the petitioner has raised, litigated and been given a ruling on the Hague 
Convention claims, any subsequent ruling by the federal court on these 
same issues would constitute interference. It seems equally clear that, if 
the state court in a custody proceeding does not have a Hague 
Convention claim before it, an adjudication of such a claim by the 
federal court would not constitute interference.” Id. at 203. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that “it is consistent with this 
purpose that it is the custody determination, not the Hague Convention 
Petition, that should be held in abeyance if proceedings are going 
forward in both state and federal courts.” Id. 
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United States v. Pojilenko, 416 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a co-conspirator’s reasonably foreseeable 
use of a minor can be attributed to other members of a conspiracy for 
purposes of applying an enhancement under §3B1.4.” Id. at 248. 
ANALYSIS: Pojilenko, a member of a criminal organization, and a 
sixteen-year-old accomplice conspired to rob drug users during an 
arranged drug transaction. Id. at 245. Pojilenko was sentenced pursuant 
to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.4, applying the two-level 
enhancement for use of a minor in the crime. Id. The Government argued 
that Pinkerton conspiracy principles allowed Pojilenko’s sentence to 
stand, but the 3rd Circuit disagreed, holding that “§ 3B1.4 ‘specifie[s]’ 
that ‘use of a minor’ enhancements be individualized, and thus not based 
on the acts of co-conspirators.” Id. at 248. 
CONCLUSION: The Pinkerton principles of co-conspiracy should 
not be applied in the context of “use of a minor” in crimes for 
determining the proper sentence. Id. at 249. 
 
Johnson v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether an alien who prevailed on his petition for 
asylum, but whose case was remanded to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”), which has the authority to reverse that ruling, is 
considered a “prevailing party” for the purposes of obtaining attorneys’ 
fees. Id. at 208. 
ANALYSIS: Johnson, the petitioner for asylum, a Liberian native 
who was forced to serve in the National Patriotic Front of Liberia before 
deserting, petitioned for asylum. Id. at 207. The BIA denied his petition, 
saying that Johnson had “failed to show that he was persecuted on 
account of his political opinion.” Id. On appeal the 3rd Circuit disagreed 
and held that the BIA’s decision was “not supported by substantial 
evidence” and remanded the case. Id. Johnson then moved for attorneys’ 
fees for the appeal and the 3rd Circuit decided that under the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Schaefer, Johnson “secured the setting aside of an 
erroneous BIA decision,” and was therefore entitled to attorneys’ fees. 
Id. at 209. 
CONCLUSION: “[A]n alien whose petition for review of a BIA 
decision is granted by our Court and whose case is then remanded to the 
BIA is a prevailing party under the EAJA, and may therefore be entitled 
to attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 210. 
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In re Joubert, 411 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether contested fees “first disclosed in the interim 
between confirmation and discharge,” thereby invoking § 506(b) rather 
than § 524, allows for a private right of action. Id. at 455. 
ANALYSIS: “Typically, challenges to creditor collection efforts 
occur post-discharge, and thus arise under 11 U.S.C. § 524, which 
governs the effect of bankruptcy discharges. . . . Under § 524(a)(2), a 
discharge operates as an injunction against a broad array of creditor 
efforts to collect debts as personal liabilities of the discharged debtor.” 
Id. at 455-56. The court found § 524 case law in this and other circuits 
persuasive and thus, applicable to § 506(b) claims. The court explained 
that it saw “no reason why the rule should be different for actions 
asserted under § 506(b) rather than § 524. The essence of the complaint 
is the same regardless of when the alleged violation was disclosed . . . .” 
Id. at 456. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded “that the decisions holding that 
§ 105(a) does not authorize separate lawsuits as a remedy for bankruptcy 
violations, though established in the § 524 context, are equally applicable 
when the underlying complaint is grounded in § 506(b).” Id. 
 
In re Thompson, 418 F.3d 362 (3d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a restitution order from a state criminal 
prosecution for theft by deception, which directs payment to the fraud 
victim, is exempt from a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge . . . .” Id. at 
363. 
ANALYSIS: Thompson was convicted for fraudulently procuring 
money for construction contracts, pled guilty to a lesser charge, and was 
ultimately sentenced to 5 years probation and ordered to pay restitution 
to his victims. Id. at 364. During the pendency of his criminal case he 
was given a discharge under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy code. Id. at 
363. Thompson claimed that his bankruptcy discharge wiped away his 
restitution obligations, but the 3rd Circuit disagreed with his contentions. 
Id. at 364. Instead, the court determined that the principles of federalism 
and congressional intent governed the case of state-mandated restitution. 
Id. at 367-68.  History and tradition regarding the application of the 
bankruptcy laws led the 3rd Circuit to conclude that congressional 
silence on the matter “dictates that we not interfere with New Jersey’s 
criminal restitution order.” Id. at 368. 
CONCLUSION: If state law provides for criminal restitution, such 
debts are not dischargeable under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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Paripovic v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: What factors should be considered in determining 
where a refugee applicant has “last habitually resided,” for purposes of 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  Id. at 241. 
ANALYSIS: Plaintiff, an ethnic Serb living in Croatia was denied 
refugee status at his deportation proceedings by an immigration judge. 
Id. at 242-43. The judge issued a deportation order listing Serbia first, 
then Croatia, as plaintiff’s deportation countries. Id. at 243. Plaintiff 
claimed that he was a “stateless” refugee who had resided in Croatia but 
now has nowhere safe to return. Id. at 244-45. On review, the 3rd Circuit 
noted that although the Immigration and Naturalization Act did not 
define the term “last habitually resided,” it was appropriate for the 
immigration judge to consider the amount of time the plaintiff spent in 
Serbia when determining his last habitual residence. Id. at 245. The 
court’s ruling hinged upon the Immigration and Nationalization Act, that 
defines “residence” as “the place of general abode . . . without regard to 
intent.” Id. (emphasis added).   
CONCLUSION: To determine a last habitual residence under the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act, a court may look to established 
residences, as well as permanent and semi-permanent places where one 
lived, but should not look to the intent of the refugee status applicant. Id. 
 
Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether “dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate 
remedy for a violation of Brady v. Maryland.” Id. at 250. 
ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court held in Brady that “suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates 
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.” Id. at 251 n.1 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963)). The 3rd Circuit found instructive United States v. Morrison, 
which “expressed a preference for suppression of evidence or retrial as a 
more appropriate remedy for a pre-trial constitutional violation.” Id. at 
253 (citing 449 U.S. 361 (1981)). The 3rd Circuit noted that no circuits 
have upheld a dismissal with prejudice for a Brady violation. Id. at 254 
n.6. As a result, the court ruled that dismissal with prejudice might be 
appropriate only where there was deliberate misconduct on the part of 
the prosecution. Id. at 254-55. 
CONCLUSION: Absent deliberate misconduct, dismissal with 
prejudice is an inappropriate remedy for a violation of Brady v. 
Maryland. Id. at 259.   
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FOURTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Taylor, 414 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether “a criminal defendant [has] a federal 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel with regard to a 
post-conviction, post-direct appeal motion for reduction of sentence 
made by the government pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
35(b).” Id. at 530. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the Sixth Amendment does not 
guarantee a defendant a right to counsel in this situation. Id. at 535. The 
court explained that although the Sixth Amendment provides a right to 
counsel on direct appeals to which the defendant is entitled as a matter of 
right, such protections do not extend to direct discretionary appeals. Id. at 
536. The court reasoned that “because a defendant has no federal 
constitutional right to counsel when pursuing a discretionary appeal on 
direct review of his conviction, a fortiori, he has no such right when the 
government makes a motion which can only benefit him by reducing his 
already final sentence.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “neither the Constitution’s equal 
protection guarantees nor due process guarantees provide criminal 
defendants a right to effective assistance of counsel with respect to a 
motion by the government pursuant to Rule 35(b).” Id. 
 
United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[Whether] venue on a false claim charge may be 
proper in a district into which the victimized government agency had 
passed the subject claim after its initial presentation to that agency (either 
by the defendant or an intermediary).” Id. at 530. 
ANALYSIS: Ebersole, the president and director of a business that 
dealt with the federal government, challenged the district court’s holding 
that venue was appropriate “in any district into which the victimized 
federal agency passed the [false] claim, in the normal course of its 
business, following the [false] claim’s initial presentation to that 
agency.” Id. at 528. The 4th Circuit, building on its decision in United 
States v. Bleeker, 657 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1981), reasoned that false 
claims may constitute continuing offenses for the purpose of establishing 
venue. Id. at 531. In addition, the court noted that the mere presentation 
of a false claim to the government could amount to an offense. See id. at 
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531. Multiple presentations of false claims could establish venue in many 
different districts. Id. at 530. “As nothing in Blecker compels a contrary 
conclusion, it is of no significance that the false claims there were 
presented directly to the targeted federal agency just once (by the 
intermediary), and that Ebersole’s false claims were presented directly to 
the agencies multiple times (as they passed the claims internally in the 
course of processing them for payment).” Id. at 531. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit concluded that a false claim charge 
is proper in a district into which the victimized government agency has 
passed the subject claim after its initial presentation to that agency. Id. at 
531.   
 
United Sates v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defendant may . . . waive his right to 
attack his conviction and sentence collaterally.” Id. at 220 
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit cited, without analysis, to those circuits 
which hold that “the right to attack a sentence collaterally may be waived 
as long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary” and declined “to 
distinguish the enforceability of a waiver of direct-appeal rights from a 
waiver of collateral-attack rights in [a] plea agreement.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit found that a “criminal defendant 
may waive his right to attack his conviction and sentence collaterally, so 
long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary.” Id. 
 
Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a state law permitting jails to collect a $1.00 
per day fee from inmates’ accounts to defray the cost of housing those 
inmates is in violation of the “due process liberty right to be free from 
punishment before conviction.” Id. at 246.  
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit began by noting that “[a]lthough 
detainees have a right to be free from punishment, clearly ‘not every 
inconvenience encountered during pretrial detention amounts to 
punishment in the constitutional sense.’” Id. at 250. The court enunciated 
a two-part standard by which it could be determined whether an action 
by a jail constitutes a punishment.  Id. at 251. First, the determination 
would need to be made that the fee amounted to a disability. Second, if 
such a finding were made, the court would next need to consider whether 
the action was taken with the express intent to punish; or, if there was no 
such express intent “whether ‘an alternative purpose to which [the act] 
may rationally be connected is assignable for it’ and the action does not 
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appear ‘excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.’” Id. at 
251 (citations omitted). The 4th Circuit noted that it did not need to 
address the question of whether the fee amounted to a disability because 
the second part of the inquiry was not established in this case. Id. at 251-
51. The court found that the fee demonstrated no express intent to 
punish, and was also supported by the legitimate government purpose of 
defraying the cost of providing for prisoners. Id. at 252. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that a state law allowing jails to 
assess a $1.00 a day fee to pretrial detainees’ accounts is not 
unconstitutional as a punishment before conviction Id. 
 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d 703 (5th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether a Louisiana conviction of the inchoate crime 
of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute can be 
construed as a ‘serious drug offense,’ as defined under § 924(e).3.” Id. at 
705. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit turned to its sister courts, which hold 
that inchoate crimes may constitute serious drug offenses, even where 
they are not specifically listed in the statutory language. Id. at 707. In a 
case the 5th Circuit found partially persuasive, United States v, King, the 
2nd Circuit court placed importance on the statutory language “involving 
serious drug offense[s].” Id. (citing 325 F.3d 110, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2003), 
(emphasis added)). The King court took an expansive view of the word 
‘involving,’ stating that it “‘must be read as including more than merely 
the crimes of distribution, manufacturing, and importation themselves.’” 
Id. (citing King, 325 F.3d at 113). The 5th Circuit adopted the holding in 
King, finding that the inchoate crime of attempted possession with intent 
to distribute to qualify as a serious crime under § 924(e). Id.  
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit concluded that inchoate crimes 
qualify as serious drug offenses under § 924(e) since the term 
“involving” should be read expansively to include crimes not specifically 
listed in the statutory language. Id.  
 
In re Reed, 405 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether § 726(a)(5) entitles a trustee to interest on 
his compensation and reimbursement award, and if so, at what point such 
interest begins to accrue.” Id. at 340. 
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ANALYSIS: Answering this question in the negative, the 5th Circuit 
noted it was interpreting the section to conform with Congress’s intent. 
Id. at 340.  As such, “[d]isallowing trustees to recover under § 726(a) 
[did] not leave them without a means to ultimately receive the monies 
they are due [because] the fees and expenses sought by trustees in 
bankruptcy proceedings are clearly allowed under § 503(b)(2), with 
payment authorized by § 503(a).” Id. at 343.  
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that § 726(a)(5) precluded the 
recovery of interest on reimbursement awards. Id.  
 
Praylor v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice, 423 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the Eighth Amendment requires prison 
facilities to “provide hormone treatment to transsexual inmates . . . .” Id. 
at 525. 
ANALYSIS: With little discussion, the 5th Circuit determined that it 
“will follow those circuits that have determined transsexualism to be a 
serious medical need raising Eighth Amendment considerations.” Id. at 
525. Cabining this declaration, the court noted that “while some method 
of treatment of inmate transsexuals is required, such inmates do not have 
a constitutional right to hormone therapy. Rather, the prison facility must 
afford the transsexual inmate some form of treatment based upon the 
specific circumstances of each case.” Id. at 525-6. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that transsexualism in prison 
inmates may raise Eighth Amendment considerations, but the extent of 
treatment required turns on the specific circumstances of the inmate. Id.  
 
White Buffalo Ventures, L.L.C v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366 
(5th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited 
Pornography and Marketings Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM) preempts state 
actors’ ability to block spam emails. Id. at 371. 
ANALYSIS: White Buffalo sent thousands of unsolicited e-mails to 
University of Texas (UT) students. Id. at 369. When the university 
blocked them, White Buffalo claimed that CAN-SPAM’s preemption 
clause prevented UT from blocking the emails because the university 
was a state actor. Id. at 371. The 5th Circuit disagreed, finding there to be 
“two competing interpretations” of CAN-SPAM’s preemptive power. Id. 
at 372. 
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CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit concluded that because there is no 
clear interpretation of CAN-SPAM’s preemption clause, the court “must 
not infer preemption” and UT can block spam emails. Id. at 372. 
 
Long v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether an alien’s appeal [to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)] is withdrawn under § 3.4 by virtue of the 
alien’s ‘involuntary or unknowing departure from the United States.’” Id. 
at 518. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit conducted a de novo review of the 
BIA’s conclusion that the involuntary departure of the alien from the 
United States resulted in the withdrawal of the alien’s appeal under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.4. Id. at 519. The court considered the reasonableness of 
the BIA interpretations of the immigration regulations and whether the 
factual findings of the BIA were supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 
519. The court concluded that the alien’s actions were consistent with 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.4 and noted that § 1003.4 on its face, “does not distinguish 
between [involuntary and voluntary.]” Id. at 520. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit ultimately found that withdrawal of 
appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4, can occur where an alien has 
voluntarily or involuntarily departed from the United States. Id.  
 
McClaren v. Morrison Mgmt. Specialists, 420 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether plaintiff, in light of supporting statements 
made in connection with an application for social security disability 
benefits, is judicially estopped from making a prima facie case of age 
discrimination. Id. at 461. 
ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court addressed this question in 
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), and held that 
although social security disability and Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) claims seem incompatible, the two claims can be reconciled 
and applied to a single individual where the individual can sufficiently 
explain the inconsistency. Id. at 463. The 5th Circuit agreed with the 
Supreme Court’s rationale in Cleveland and applied it to this case. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that where a plaintiff’s 
statements on his social security disability application made prior to his 
not being selected for the assistant director position contained 
descriptions of his pains, injuries, and health conditions, plaintiff was 
estopped from claiming age discrimination under the ADA.  Id. at 464. 
The plaintiff claimed that the company’s decision not to give him the 
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assistant director position compelled him to elect to have debilitating 
spinal surgery and but for the company’s decision he would have chosen 
a less intrusive treatment.  The court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim 
was insufficient to explain his statements on his disability application. Id. 
 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether “increased risk allegedly serious enough to 
require current medical monitoring qualified as injury in fact, conferring 
standing.” Id. at 568. 
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed case law from other circuits that 
held that a condition, which enhances the risk of future injury and thus 
requiring medical monitoring, constitutes injury in fact. Id. at 571-74. 
Adopting this position, the court held that if facts are alleged which 
“suggest an increased risk of future harm” there is an injury in fact, and, 
thus, standing. Id. at 574. 
CONCLUSION: An increased risk of serious injury which requires 
medical monitoring constitutes an injury in fact. Id. 
 
Rittenhouse v. Eisen, 404 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether pre-petition attorney fees are dischargeable 
in bankruptcy . . . .” Id. at 396. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “11 U.S.C. § 727(b) provides that 
a discharge under Chapter 7 relieves a debtor of all debts incurred prior 
to the filing of a petition for bankruptcy, except those nineteen categories 
of debts specifically enumerated in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). A debt for pre-
petition legal services is not one of the non-dischargeable debts 
enumerated in § 523(a).” Id. The court noted that 11 U.S.C. § 329 would 
not be rendered meaningless because pre-petition attorney fees were held 
to be dischargeable. Id. at 397. The court reasoned that § 329 does in fact 
add to Chapter 7 proceedings. Id. For example, the court noted, § 329 
covers post-petition attorney fees. Id. 
CONCLUSION: In applying the clear language of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the court held that pre-petition attorney fees are dischargeable. Id. 
at 396. 
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Golden v. Gorno Bros., Inc, 410 F.3d 879 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Issue before the court was how to calculate the amount 
in controversy, required for federal jurisdiction, under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301. Id. at 882. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to the 3rd and 7th Circuits for 
guidance in this matter. The 7th Circuit has applied a distinct formula to 
cases concerning defective vehicles: the cost of a replacement vehicle 
minus the present value of the defective vehicle is further reduced by the 
value one obtains from his or her use of that vehicle. Id. at 883 (citing 
Schimmer v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 384 F.3d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
Furthermore, because the Act provides that the amount in controversy 
does not include interest, a finance contract should not determine federal 
jurisdiction. Id. at 883-84.   
CONCLUSION: Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that “finance 
charges of a contract should not be added when determining if the 
amount in controversy has been satisfied.” Id. at 885.  Thus, the proper 
formula is determined by subtracting the present value of a defective 
vehicle from the cost of a replacement vehicle. Id.  
 
United States v. Cole, 418 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a state conviction for being a minor in 
possession of alcohol is ‘countable’ under § 4A1.2(c) of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines (‘the Guidelines’) for purposes of 
calculating a federal defendant’s criminal history score.” Id. at 593. 
ANALYSIS: Defendant had been convicted of possession with the 
intent to distribute the drug Ecstasy and at sentencing, the trial judge 
used his convictions as a minor to increase his sentence. Id. at 593-94. 
The court discussed the factors taken by other circuits, including the 
“multi-factor” approach taken by the 5th Circuit, the “elements” 
approach of the 3rd Circuit, the “essential characteristics” approach of 
the 10th Circuit, and a blended approach of the 9th Circuit. Id. at 595-97. 
In using the 10th Circuit’s “essential characteristics” test, the court 
explained that the proper evaluation should be to “consider the similarity 
between the “essential characteristics” of the activity underlying the 
offense of prior conviction and those underlying the listed offense.” Id. at 
598. As a result of this balancing test, the court overturned the 
application of defendant’s prior criminal offenses which were committed 
when he was a minor. Id. at 600. 
CONCLUSION: The “essential characteristics” balancing test is 
appropriate to determine if an offense committed when one was a 
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juvenile can be used as a sentencing factor under the Guidelines. Id. at 
598. 
 
Miltimore Sales, Inc. v. Int’l Rectifier, Inc., 412 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: “Is a motion for attorney fees under [Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure] 54(d)(2)(B) timely if filed within fourteen days of the 
district court’s denial of a timely filed Rule 59(e) motion?” Id. at 687. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit looked to the meaning of the word 
“judgment” as used in FRCP 54 to determine when the tolling began and 
whether or not a final judgment is required after a dismissal of a FRCP 
59(e) motion. Id. at 688. “The disposition of the Rule 59(e) motions is an 
order or ruling that reinstates the finality of the original entry of 
judgment and a ruling that makes the underlying judgment appealable.” 
Id. The court aligned itself with similar holdings from the 2nd and 11th 
circuits and attempted to clarify the inefficiency and confusion created 
by the federal rule. Id. at 689-691. 
CONCLUSION: “We hold that because a timely filed Rule 59(e) 
motion destroys the finality of judgment, a motion for attorney fees filed 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B) is timely if filed 
within fourteen days of the order disposing of the Rule 59(e) motion.” Id. 
at 691. 
 
In re Lott, 139 F. App’x 658 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant’s “assertion of actual innocence 
effect[s] a waiver of the attorney-client and work product privileges.” Id. 
at 660. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision to 
execute a discovery order for attorney-client and work product privilege 
material because defendant had asserted himself innocent of murder 
during a habeas proceeding. Id. at 659. The district court had determined 
as a matter of first impression that defendant’s claim of innocence would 
act as an implied waiver to discussions with attorneys and the state 
should have access to any statements made by defendant as to his 
innocence of guilt. Id. The court reasoned that implied waivers have been 
narrowly interpreted and have only applied to attorney privilege where 
the conduct of the attorney is questioned. Id. at 660. The court pointed to 
the lack of any authority supporting the district court’s finding of an 
implied waiver. Id. at 661. 
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CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit found that due to the error in the 
district court’s ruling that the defendant “shall not be required to waive 
the attorney-client privilege or the work product privilege.” Id. at 663. 
 
United States v. Palcios-Suarez, 418 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether a state-felony drug conviction, which would 
not be a felony under federal law, could nevertheless constitute an 
‘aggravated felony’ as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).” Id. at 694. 
ANALYSIS: The defendant appealed the district court’s sentence 
imposed upon him after he pleaded guilty to “illegally reentering the 
United States after having been previously removed.” Id. at 694. The 
sentence rendered was enhanced because of the defendant’s two prior 
drug convictions. Id. The defendant based his appeal on two issues. The 
first, and most important, issue raised by the defendant is that the district 
court committed a reversible error by concluding that his sentence should 
be enhanced because of his prior state-law felony convictions, which the 
court considered to be “aggravated felonies.” Id. The 6th Circuit agreed 
with the defendant in that the previous two drug convictions were not 
“aggravated felonies.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the defendant’s two prior 
cocaine convictions did not constitute “aggravated felonies” and did not 
authorize the sentencing enhancement found in the Immigration & 
Nationality Act. Id. at 694. 
 
United States v. Bernal-Aveja, 414 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether a burglary of a dwelling charge in an 
indictment is sufficient to prove, without more, that a guilty plea to a 
lesser included burglary offense constitutes ‘a crime of violence’ under 
the [United States Sentencing] Guidelines.” Id. at 627. 
ANALYSIS: The defendant pled guilty to illegally reentering the 
United States and was sentenced by the district court to fifty-seven 
months in prison.  Id. at 626. The district court ruled that the defendant’s 
prior conviction for burglary was a “crime of violence” and enhanced the 
defendant’s sentence.  Id. The defendant appealed the district court’s 
decision that the prior burglary conviction was a “crime of violence.” Id. 
The 6th Circuit stated that “‘a crime of violence’ includes ‘burglary 
of a dwelling’” and that the government holds the burden of proof in 
demonstrating that the defendant’s previous conviction was a “crime of 
violence.” Id. Since the defendant’s prior guilty plea did not specify what 
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type of structure was burglarized, the court cannot presume that the 
defendant committed “burglary of a dwelling.” Id. at 627-628. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that the burglary of a dwelling 
charge “was insufficient” in proving that the defendant’s guilty plea to a 
“lesser included burglary offense” constituted a crime of violence that 
justified the use of the sentencing enhancement. Id. at 628. 
 
Lukowski v. CSX Transp., Inc., 416 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether a plaintiff who is within the ‘zone of danger’ 
may recover damages under FELA [Federal Employer’s Liability Act] 
for emotional distress suffered not as a result of fear for personal 
physical safety, but rather, as a result of witnessing a third party’s peril.” 
Id. at 482. 
ANALYSIS: The court’s analysis began by stating that “in order to 
recover emotional distress damages under FELA, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that he or she was within the ‘zone of danger’ of physical 
impact.” Id. FELA “refers simply to ‘injury,’ which may encompass both 
physical and emotional injury.” Id. Therefore, the court decided that “the 
common law ‘zone of danger’ test limits recovery for emotional injury to 
those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant’s 
negligent conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm 
by that conduct.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit ruled that the phrase “emotional 
injury caused by physical injury to himself” limits the recovery for 
emotional distress to “damages suffered as a result of a fear for one’s 
own physical safety.” Id. at 483. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s 
emotional distress injuries that did not arise out of fear for his own 
personal safety were not recoverable damages under FELA. Id. at 478.  
 
United States v. Hargrove, 416 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a “defendant’s prior convictions for violating 
[the] Ohio statute criminalizing sexual conduct with [a] stepchild” 
qualify as “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924. Id. at 486. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that ACCA defines violent felonies as 
including crimes that “have as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or another or crimes 
that involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.” Id. at 494. The 6th Circuit then used a “categorical 
approach,” which was “limited to an examination of the fact of 
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conviction and the statutory definition of the predicate offense.” Id. This 
result forces the “trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the 
statutory definition of the prior offense.” Id.  Here, the Ohio statute in 
question “does not distinguish between consensual sex and forced sex, or 
between sex with a minor and sex with an adult.” Id. at 496. Since the 
Ohio statute and the defendant’s indictment failed to make this 
distinction, this situation “does not present a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.” Id.  
CONCLUSION: The defendant’s prior felony convictions under the 
“Ohio statute criminalizing sexual conduct with [a] stepchild” do not 
constitute violent felonies under the ACCA. Id. Therefore, the sentence 
should not have been enhanced. 
 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Ioffe v. Skokie Motor Sales, Inc., 414 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Odometer Act [49 U.S.C. § 32701 
et.seq.] creates a private right of action based on a violation of 49 C.F.R. 
§ 580.5(c) where the transferor’s fraudulent intent is unrelated to a 
vehicle’s odometer or mileage.” Id. at 710. 
ANALYSIS: The plaintiff proposed a broad interpretation of the 
statute so that “a plaintiff has a private right of action under § 32710 if 
there has been a violation of the Odometer Act or any of its 
implementing regulations and the violator intended to defraud the 
plaintiff.” Id. at 711. The 7th Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s claim and 
looked to the plain meaning of the statute and Congress’s intent in 
drafting the statute. The court concluded that “the private right of action 
covers prohibited acts that are committed with fraudulent intent and 
excludes cases where some fraudulent act happens to coincide with a 
violation of a regulation but the violative act is done for reasons other 
than to perpetrate a fraud.” Id. at 712. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “[t]he Odometer Act 
creates a private right of action for violations of 49 C.F.R. § 580.5(c) 
only where a transferor chose not to disclose a vehicle’s mileage to the 
transferee in writing on the title with intent to defraud as to the vehicle’s 
mileage.” Id. at 715. 
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Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), 
should be applied retroactively. Id. at 865. 
ANALYSIS: “As a general matter, we look at the Supreme Court’s 
holdings as of the time of the relevant state court decision to determine 
clearly established federal law. The Supreme Court prohibits analyzing 
the reasonableness of a state court determination in light of a ‘new’ 
Supreme Court rule propounded after the state court made its decision.” 
Id. at 865. Therefore, the court analyzed whether Crawford announced a 
new rule. Id. In discussing the issue the court stated, “[i]t seems clear that 
Crawford was a clean break from the line of precedent established by 
Roberts. Crawford considered and rejected the continuing application of 
Roberts. Nevertheless, a state court would not have acted unreasonably 
by failing to anticipate this ruling and applying Roberts. Crawford was 
thus a new rule for purposes of Teague.” Id. at 866-67. Lastly, the court 
noted that neither of the two exceptions to the Teague rule applied to the 
present case. Id. at 867. 
CONCLUSION: “Crawford, therefore, is not a watershed change for 
purposes of the second Teague exception and does not apply 
retroactively.” Id. 867. 
 
McCready v. White, 417 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether people who wanted information under 18 
U.S.C.S. § 2721(b) had a private right of action. Id. at 702. 
ANALYSIS: “The statute authorizes private suits, but only by 
persons whose information has been disclosed improperly. § 2724(a).” 
Id. at 703. The court noted that 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 “provides a remedy 
only for the violation of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws’ of the United States. ‘Rights’ differ from ‘broader 
or vaguer benefits or interests’ that some statutes create.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “Because McCready is no different from any other 
member of the public, so far as § 2721(b) is concerned, he can’t use § 
1983 to supply the private right of action missing from § 2724(a).” Id. at 
703-04. 
 
United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether substances which are “not officially scheduled 
as controlled substances themselves [under the Controlled Substances 
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Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802] may be regulated as such if they meet the 
definition of a ‘controlled substance analogue.’” Id. at 521. 
ANALYSIS: This was an issue of statutory construction, revolving 
on the placement of the word “or” between the second and third clauses 
of the statute. Id. Because the court found there to be a lack of clarity in 
the statute, it looked to several other circuits who had interpreted the 
conjunctive reading.  This interpretation was based “largely on the 
absurd results that might obtain under a disjunctive reading, noting that 
alcohol and caffeine could be criminalized as controlled substance 
analogues based solely on the fact that, in concentrated form, they might 
have depressant or stimulant effects similar to illegal drugs.” Id. at 522-
23. Additionally, the legislative history shows that “the Act was intended 
primarily to prevent scientists from slightly modifying the chemical 
structure of banned drugs to create new ‘designer drugs’ that would have 
similar physiological effects but would not be covered by the law’s 
controlled substances schedules.” Id. at 523. 
CONCLUSION: The other circuits’ common-sense based, practical 
interpretation leads to the ultimate conclusion that the conjunctive 
reading is appropriate. Id. 
 
United States v. Deutsch, 403 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether a district court may impose consecutive 
prison terms upon revoking concurrent terms of supervised release.” Id. 
at 916. 
ANALYSIS: Other circuits, including the 8th Circuit, have clearly 
rejected the argument that a district court can impose a sentence of no 
longer than five years following a revocation of supervised release. Id. at 
917. Title 18, section 3624(e) of the U.S. Code relied on by the prisoner 
in this appeal, “simply explains when a term of supervised release begins 
to run and clarifies that it runs concurrently with other terms of 
supervised release or parole.” Id. 917. Finally, the statutory guidelines 
“limit only the length of each term, not the length of overall punishment; 
therefore, when each individual term is lawful – as here – it may be 
stacked consecutively with other lawfully imposed terms.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: A district court can exercise its own “discretion to 
impose consecutive prison terms upon revoking concurrent terms of 
supervised release.” Id. at 918. 
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In re UAL Corp., 408 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the term “‘interested party,’ as used in the 
section of the Bankruptcy Code governing rejection of [collective 
bargaining agreements] CBAs,” should it be interpreted as synonymous 
with “party in interest” Id. 
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit first stated that “[a]lthough the 
Bankruptcy Code does not define the term ‘interested party,’ . . . it is 
most naturally read to mean ‘party to the collective bargaining 
agreement’ or a guarantor of the contract.” Id. at 851. The court then 
stated that if the term ‘interested party’ were treated as a synonym of 
‘party in interest,’ then it would include “any person with a financial 
stake in the employer’s performance of the collective bargaining 
agreement.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court ruled that “interested party” was not 
synonymous with “party in interest” and that an “interested party” in this 
instance was a party to the agreement or a guarantor of that agreement. 
Id. The court’s rationale was based on a fear that to do otherwise would 
run the risk of making such proceedings unmanageable. Id. 
 
United States v. Von Loh, 417 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether separate instances of rape that involve the 
same victim can be considered separate counts for sentencing purposes. 
Id. at 712-13. 
ANALYSIS: On multiple occasions, defendant statutorily raped a 
fourteen-year-old girl he met online. Id. at 712. He was convicted based 
on one encounter but had admitted to others; the district court chose not 
to group the offenses in sentencing him. Id. Defendant argued that all the 
encounters occurred in one “relationship” and involved substantially the 
same harm, and thus should be considered one count. Id. The 7th Circuit 
disagreed and held, consistent with other circuits, that “counts should be 
grouped [only] when they involve substantially the same harm and when 
‘one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense 
characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to 
another of the counts.” Id. at 714. Since the defendant’s conduct did not 
fit into that category, his counts were separable. Id.  
CONCLUSION: Repetition of conduct in multiple acts of one crime 
does not constitute one count of that crime. Id. at 714. 
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Carruth, 418 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to a trial 
by jury is violated under Blakely v. Washington and Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, because the amount of restitution ordered was “beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum [and thus] must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 903.  
ANALYSIS: Defendant was convicted of fraud in a counterfeit 
scheme and sentenced to pay restitution under the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act (“MVRA”). Id. at 902. Under the MVRA, restitution 
claims were provable by a preponderance of the evidence, unlike 
criminal prosecutions subject to a reasonable doubt standard. Id. The 
court noted that all other circuits deciding this issue had held that 
restitution orders were not affected by Blakely and Apprendi, and did not 
“prohibit judicial fact finding for restitution orders.” Id. at 904. Because 
the MVRA did not provide any maximum limits for restitution, and 
because Blakely “dealt with determinate sentencing rather than a 
restitution statute without a set maximum limit,” the court found no 
constitutional objection to MVRA. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The MVRA restitution orders, given by a judge and 
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, are not in violation of 
Apprendi v. New Jersey or Blakely v. Washington, which require any fact 
that increases penalty for a crime beyond prescribed statutory maximum 
to be submitted to jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.  
 
Throneberry v. McGehee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d 972 (8th Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the FMLA [Family and Medical Leave Act 
of 1993] imposes strict liability for all interferences with FMLA rights, 
or whether the FMLA condones lawful interference with FMLA rights.” 
Id. at 977. 
ANALYSIS: When an employee properly makes use of her FMLA 
benefits, specifically leave time, she “does not have unlimited restoration 
rights upon returning from leave.” Id. at 978. Essentially, what the 
FMLA does provide is “leave with an expectation an employee will 
return to work after the leave ends.” Id. Furthermore, “if an employer 
were authorized to discharge an employee if the employee were not on 
FMLA leave, the FMLA does not shield an employee on FMLA leave 
from the same, lawful discharge.” Id. This notion comports with the plain 
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language and structure of the statute, the Department of Labor’s 
understanding of the FMLA, as well as the 10th Circuit. Id. at 978-79. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “an employer who interferes 
with an employee’s FMLA rights will not be liable if the employer can 
prove it would have made the same decision had the employee not 
exercised the employee’s FMLA rights” Id. at 977. 
 
United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the doctrine of equitable tolling is available 
to … a [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 movant.” Id. at 1092. 
ANALYSIS: Provided in occurs within the one-year statute of 
limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 allows for a motion to be brought to 
“vacate, set aside, or correct [a] sentence.” Id. at 1090. The 8th Circuit 
cited with approval a 9th Circuit decision, United States v. Battles, 362 
F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2004), which compared the motion brought pursuant 
to § 2255 with a habeas corpus petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
Martin, 408 F.3d at 1092. The 9th Circuit stated that both statutes “have 
the same operative language and the same purpose.” Id. (citing Battles, 
262 F.3d at 1196). Therefore, the 9th Circuit failed to see any reason “to 
distinguish between them in this regard.” Id. at 1092 (citing U.S. v. 
Battles, 262 F.3d at 1196). The 8th Circuit, following the 9th Circuit’s 
rationale joined the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, and 11th Circuits in finding 
that equitable tolling applies to § 2255. Id.  
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the 8th Circuit found that the doctrine of 
equitable tolling applies to a § 2255 movant. Id. at 1092. 
 
United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the use of [a defendant’s] post-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence during the government’s case-in-chief [is] 
constitutional.” Id. at 1109. 
ANALYSIS: Although the 8th Circuit noted that in various other 
situations use of a defendant’s silence as a sign of guilt violates the 
defendant’s rights, the court found that use of a defendant’s silence post-
arrest, pre-Miranda does not violate any of the defendant’s rights. Id. at 
1110.  The Court found that the main issue is whether the defendant was 
“under [an] ‘official compulsion to speak.’” Id. If the defendant was 
under such a compulsion, then the silence is inadmissible; however, if 
there was not official compulsion to speak, then it can be used. Id. The 
8th Circuit then found that arrest alone does not constitute “official 
compulsion to speak.” Id. at 1111. 
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CONCLUSION: Use of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence during the government’s case-in-chief is constitutional as long as 
the defendant was not under an “official compulsion to speak,” which 
arrest alone does not constitute. 
 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat’l Park Med. Cent., Inc., 413 F.3d 897 
(8th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether Erika’s civil enforcement provision 
completely preempts the civil penalties provision of the Arkansas 
[Patient Protection Act] PPA, Ark. Code Ann. § 23-99-207.” Id. at 907. 
ANALYSIS: Analyzing this question under the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), the 
court looked to the legislative scheme behind ERISA as well as the 
Arkansas PPA statute to decide whether the PPA statute conflicted the 
exclusive ERISA remedy. Id. at 914. The PPA civil penalty provision 
allowed participants to bring suit where their plan denied reimbursement 
for services from a provider. Id. This provision was expressly preempted 
by ERISA where the federal statute provided for a similar remedy. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court ultimately held that “ERISA completely 
preempts the civil penalties provision of the Arkansas PPA as applied to 
suits that could have been brought under ERISA § 502.” Id. at 908. 
 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
Bailey v. County of Riverside, 414 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the [14 day] Rule 54(d)(2)(B) time limit is 
tolled pending the outcome of post-trial motions under Rule 50 or Rule 
59.” Id. at 1025. 
ANALYSIS: “The other circuits to reach this question have held that 
the requirement that the motion for attorneys’ fees ‘must be filed no later 
than 14 days after entry of judgment’ is tolled pending the outcome of 
post-trial motions under Rule 50 or Rule 59.” Id. (citations omitted).  
“[T]hose motions operate to suspend the finality of the district court’s 
judgment.” Id. “A ‘judgment’ for purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure includes a decree or order ‘from which an appeal lies.’” Id. 
(citations omitted). “The judgment was not appealable during the 
pendency of the post trial motions in this case.” Id. 
216 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 2:175 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded held that “[t]he Rule 
54(d)(2)(B) motion for fees is timely if filed no later than 14 days after 
the resolution of a Rule 50(b), Rule 52(b), or Rule 59 motion.” Id. 
 
Lisbey v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a conviction of an alien for sexual battery in 
California constitutes an aggravated felony rendering that alien 
removable from the country under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Id. at 930-
31. 
ANALYSIS: Lisbey pled guilty to sexual battery in California, which 
proscribes the use of physical force to perform an act for sexual 
gratification, arousal or abuse. Id. at 931 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 
243.4(a)). Under the INA, an alien is deportable if convicted of an 
aggravated felony, which includes a “crime of violence” in its definition 
Id. To be considered a crime of violence, the crime must include a 
“‘substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of 
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.’” Id. at 
932. Decisions by the Supreme Court, as well as other circuits, held that 
sexual crimes were crimes of violence. Id. at 932-33 (citing Leocal v. 
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004); United States v. Wood, 52 F.3d 272, 276 
(9th Cir. 1995); Zaidi v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2004); 
Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1993). 
CONCLUSION: A conviction for sexual battery in California 
constitutes an aggravated felony, rendering an alien convicted of that 
crime removable pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 
Hawthorne Sav. F.S.B. v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 421 F.3d 835 (9th 
Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1011 et seq. “bars the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, from 
preempting or otherwise interfering with Pennsylvania’s rehabilitation 
and liquidation statutes.” Id. at 842. 
ANALYSIS: The McCarran-Ferguson Act “provides that ‘[n]o Act of 
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law 
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such 
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.’” Id. The defendant 
argued that federal jurisdiction impaired “the operation of Pennsylvania’s 
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state-law liquidation regime.” Id. The court disagreed and, relying on 
Gross v. Weingarten, 217 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2000), held that § 1332 did 
not dispossess Pennsylvania of jurisdiction over the liquidation and 
disposition of assets. Hawthorne, 421 F.3d at 842.   
CONCLUSION: 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is not pre-empted by the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 844. 
 
United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the admission of a “certificate of nonexistence 
of record” (“CNR”) violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause rights in light of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36 (2004). Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 828. 
ANALYSIS: Under Crawford, non-testimonial evidence is not 
subject to the Confrontation Clause, and common law exceptions to 
hearsay typically encompass non-testimonial evidence. Id. at 832. The 
district court had approved the use of the CNR under the business 
records exception to hearsay. Id. at 833. The court, finding that records 
are regularly kept by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, found 
that those records constitute business records.  Thus, an affidavit 
concerning those records properly fell within the scope of the business 
records exemption, making the CNR non-testimonial evidence which is 
not barred by Crawford. Id. at 833-34. 
CONCLUSION: The admission of a CNR, in which an Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (“INS”) stated there was no evidence in INS 
records that alien had received permission for admission into the United 
States, does not violate an alien’s Confrontation Clause rights. Id. at 828. 
 
United States v. Carter, 421 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: What is the meaning of the phrase “altered or 
obliterated” as used in United States Sentencing Guidelines § 
2K2.1(b)(4)?  Id. at 910. 
ANALYSIS: Noting that no court has ruled on the question, the 9th 
Cir. looked at the plain language of the statute. Id. at 911. The court 
rejected the requirement put forth by the defendant that the serial number 
of a gun must be untraceable by microscopy. Id. Because “altered or 
obliterated” is phrased in the disjunctive, and because the word “altered” 
can be defined as “to change or make different,” a change which makes 
the serial number unobservable to the naked eye suffices for U.S.S.G. § 
2K2.1(b)(4). Id. at 912-13. The court found that neither the structural 
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context nor the legislative history dictated an alternative result. Id. at 
913-14. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “for the purposes of Guideline § 
2K2.1(b)(4), a firearm’s serial number is ‘altered or obliterated’ when it 
is materially changed in a way that makes accurate information less 
accessible.” Id. at 910. The court further held that, “under that standard, a 
serial number which is not discernable to the unaided eye, but which 
remains detectable via microscopy, is altered or obliterated.” Id.  
 
United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether, for [FED. R. CRIM. P.] 41 purposes, a 
deputation as a Special Deputy U.S. Marshal confers ‘federal law 
enforcement officer’ status on a state law enforcement official.” Id. at 
1070. 
ANALYSIS: “Statutes and regulations give the Marshals authority to 
deputize local law enforcement officials to ‘perform the functions of 
Deputy U.S. Marshals’” Id. U.S. Marshals have long had the authority to 
“seek and execute federal search warrants.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a “state law enforcement 
officer’s deputation as a Special Deputy U.S. Marshal made him a 
“federal law enforcement officer,” for purposes of [FED. R. CRIM. P. 41] 
governing who may request federal search warrants.” Id. 
 
Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: In a civil rights case, what is “the appropriate test of 
benchmarking [a] hybrid right,” one which “involves both speech and 
associational rights under the First Amendment?” Id. at 693.  
ANALYSIS: Here, the court looked to what other circuits have done 
in similar hybrid cases. Id. at 696-98. First, the court noted the 2nd 
Circuit applied the Pickering test to a case where a teacher was 
terminated when it was discovered that he belonged to a certain 
association. Id. at 696. Second, the court stated that both the 7th and 11th 
Circuits have reasoned that the Pickering/Connick analysis “does not 
adequately protect associational claims.” Id. 697-98. Therefore, the court 
stated “[b]earing in mind the Supreme Court’s seminal public employee 
speech cases and their application in cases from the other circuits, we 
conclude that Pickering should be applied in this hybrid rights case. The 
speech and associational rights at issue here are so intertwined that we 
see no reason to distinguish this hybrid circumstance from a case 
involving only speech rights.” Id. at 698. 
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CONCLUSION: “We conclude that this case should be evaluated 
under the balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of Education, 
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), and that under Pickering, the college’s 
legitimate safety and pedagogical concerns outweighed the instructor’s 
rights.” Id. 693. 
 
Posnanski v. Gibney, 421 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the 9th Circuit “[m]ay . . . review the decision 
of a district court outside [its] circuit to transfer a case into [its] circuit” 
Id. at 978. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first rejected petitioner’s contention that 
precedent suggested that such review was permissible, as neither case 
“actually dealt with a ‘transferor court . . . not within [the 9th] circuit . . . 
.” Id. at 979. The court then discussed the position adopted by seven of 
its sister circuits, who “have all held that a transferee circuit does not 
have jurisdiction to review a transfer court order by a transferor in 
another circuit.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit ultimately joined its sister circuits, 
holding that a 28 U.S.C. § 1404 transfer is not subject to review “by a 
district court outside of [its] circuit to a district court within [its] circuit.” 
Id. at 980. 
 
In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, and to what extent, a bankruptcy court-
appointed trustee of a liquidating trust may be sued in a foreign 
jurisdiction without permission of the court appointing the trustee.” Id. at 
970. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first turned to the Barton doctrine, 
“established by the Supreme Court over a century ago, which provides 
that, before suit can be brought against a court-appointed receiver, ‘leave 
of the court by which he was appointed must be obtained.’” Id. at 970-71 
(citing Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 (1881)). The court found 
the doctrine to apply in bankruptcy because “‘[t]he trustee in bankruptcy 
is a statutory successor to the equity receiver,’ and ‘[j]ust like the equity 
receiver, a trustee in bankruptcy is working in effect for the court that 
appointed or approved him, administering property that has come under 
the court’s control by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code.’” Id. at 971. 
Joining its sister circuits, the court held that “a party must first obtain 
leave of the bankruptcy court before it initiates an action in another 
forum against a bankruptcy trustee or other officer appointed by the 
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bankruptcy court for acts done in the officer’s official capacity.” Id. at 
970. 
CONCLUSION: “The requirement of uniform application of 
bankruptcy law dictates that all legal proceedings that affect the 
administration of the bankruptcy estate be brought either in bankruptcy 
court or with leave of the bankruptcy court.” Id. at 971. 
 
Bassidji v. Goe, 413 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an American citizen’s guarantees of 
payments that furthered a trade agreement with an Iranian company are 
covered by . . . Executive Order [13,059 § 2(d)] and, if so, whether the 
guarantees are unenforceable as a result.” Id. at 930. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit interpreted the Executive Order as it 
would a statute; therefore, the analysis commenced with an examination 
of the text. After applying the express language of the Executive Order to 
the facts presented, the court reviewed the district court’s holding that 
such guarantee agreements could facilitate trade between Iran and Hong 
Kong by a U.S. citizen. 
CONCLUSION: The court held “that the guarantees were illegal 
under the Executive Order and, under the circumstances of this case, 
unenforceable.” Id. at 930. 
 
Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[Whether] the favorable termination rule of Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), appl[ies] to civil commitments under 
California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act [SVPA]” Id. at 1137. 
ANALYSIS: The court first determined whether Heck’s reference to 
“prisoners” only applied to convicted criminals. “Heck’s favorable 
termination rule was intended to prevent a person in custody from using 
[42 U.S.C. § 1983] to circumvent the more stringent requirements for 
habeas corpus.” Id. at 1139. Since detainees under statutes such as SVPA 
may use a habeas petition to challenge the terms of their confinement, 
the court reasoned that Heck must apply to those SVPA detainees with 
access to habeas relief. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit, affirming the district court’s 
dismissal, “conclude[d] that the Heck rule applies” to such commitments. 
Id. at 1137. 
 
2005] First Impressions 221 
Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 416 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 
2005)  
QUESTION: “Does [the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s] adverse action 
notice requirement apply to the rate first charged in an initial policy of 
insurance?” Id. at 1100. 
ANALYSIS: Congress mandated that once consumers possess their 
credit reports, they will be able to make corrections to and check for any 
errors. Id. at 1107. The court noted that “[t]his increases the chances that 
a consumer’s financial stability will not be hampered by faulty credit 
information.” Id. at 1107-08. The 9th Circuit also found that informing 
individuals of bad credit scores can serve to help them learn of the 
benefits of higher credit ratings and how to accomplish those ends. Id. at 
1108. The court stressed that initial insurance policies, policies that 
economically unsophisticated individuals are likely to purchase, must be 
protected otherwise the Act would be of little consequence. Id. 
CONCLUSION: “The Act requires that an insurance company send 
the consumer an adverse action notice whenever a higher rate is charged 
because of credit information it obtains, regardless of whether the rate is 
contained in an initial policy or an extension or renewal of a policy and 
regardless of whether the company has previously charged the consumer 
a lower rate.” Id. at 1100. [see also 2005 WL 2714503] 
 
United States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether “the retroactivity principles of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause preclude the retroactive application of 
the remedial holding of United States v. Booker, which excised portions 
of Title 18 of the United States Code in order to make the Sentencing 
Guidelines effectively advisory.” Id. at 918. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that “in Booker, the Supreme 
Court expressly stated that both holdings should be applied to cases on 
direct review.” Id. at 920. “And our decision in Ameline, under which 
Sixth Amendment violations can be cured by giving district courts the 
opportunity to resentence defendants under the now-advisory Guidelines, 
necessarily implies that appellate courts should apply both Booker 
holdings retroactively.” Id.  
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit rejected Defendant’s argument and 
held that he may be resentenced according to the principles set forth in 
Booker and Ameline.” Id. at 918. 
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Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 416 F.3d 
1025 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “May a private, nonsectarian, commercially operated 
school, which receives no federal funds, purposefully exclude a student 
qualified for admission solely because he is not of pure or part aboriginal 
blood?” Id. at 1027. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “a private school’s admissions 
preference cannot be exclusively racial, yet simultaneously subject to the 
special relationship doctrine. The Court’s decision in [Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)] took pains to emphasize the nonracial 
nature of the challenged hiring preference, expressly ruling that the 
precise classification at issue, which was based on Indian tribal 
affiliation, was not racial, but, rather, political in nature; for this reason, 
it was subject only to rational basis review.” Id. at 1047. “The same 
principle does not apply to the classification employed by the 
Kamehameha Schools, which Appellees concede to be exclusively racial 
in nature, design and purpose.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[W]e agree with Doe and find that the Schools’ 
admissions policy, which operates in practice as an absolute bar to 
admission for those of the non-preferred race, constitutes unlawful race 
discrimination in violation of § 1981.” Id. at 1027. 
 
Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether federal law may preempt contrary state law as 
applied to operating subsidiaries of national banks. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked into whether California’s regulations 
allowing national banks to create and operate subsidiaries was consistent 
with the federal Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.A § 21 et seq. Id. at 958. Secondly, 
the court considered if California was even allowed to regulate such 
entities. Id. The court noted that all of the other circuit and district courts 
had determined that federal law trumped state law. Id. n.10. As given in 
the Bank Act, the court found “that a state law is preempted as applied to 
an operating subsidiary only if it would be preempted as applied to a 
national bank.” Id. at 962.  “Operating subsidiaries are subject to no less 
and no more governmental regulation, state and federal, than national 
banks.” Id.  
CONCLUSION: Under the Bank Act, agencies may promulgate 
regulations providing for the preemption of state banking law in order to 
regulate operating subsidiaries of national banks. Id. at 954. 
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Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether an abstention from the Younger doctrine 
trumps the intervention of right doctrine expressed in Rule 24(a)(2) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1112. 
ANALYSIS: The Younger doctrine is a jurisdictional doctrine, and 
while it “neither provides a basis for nor destroys federal jurisdiction, 
Younger does determine when the federal courts must ‘refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction.’” Id. at 1113. On the other hand, Rule 24 is a 
more discretionary procedural doctrine. Id. Furthermore, intervention of 
right does not alter federal jurisdiction. Id. Finally, “[b]ecause Rule 24 
cannot extend federal jurisdiction and Younger abstention imposes 
mandatory limits on the federal courts’ ability to exercise jurisdiction, 
[the court held] that intervention as of right cannot be used to circumvent 
Younger abstention.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: A district court is “not required to consider the 
merits of intervention before disposing of [an] action under Younger.” Id. 
at 1114. 
 
Gonzales v. Free Speech Coal., 408 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a group bringing an overbreadth challenge to 
the Child Pornography Prevention Act (“CPPA”) was entitled to receive 
attorney’s fees against the government due to the fact that the 
“government was not substantially justified in defending the CPPA 
because ‘the constitutional flaw in the CPPA was recognizable from the 
start.’” Id. at 617-18. 
ANALYSIS: Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), a 
party prevailing against the government is entitled to attorney’s fees 
unless the government demonstrates “‘that the position of the United 
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an 
award unjust.’” Id. at 618. Substantial justification means that the dispute 
at issue is something over which reasonable minds could differ. Id. The 
views of other courts are significant to answering the question of whether 
reasonable minds could differ, and so is a demonstrated string of losses 
or successes by the government in arguing its position. Id. In this case 
the 9th Circuit found there was substantial disagreement among the 
courts of that circuit as well as disagreement among the circuits as to 
whether the CPPA was unconstitutionally overbroad. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit found such disagreement to be 
indicative of the fact that reasonable minds could differ over the merit of 
the government’s position, and that the government was therefore 
justified in defending itself. Id. at 619-20. This being the case, a party 
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prevailing against the government in a challenge to the CPPA would not 
be entitled to attorney’s fees under the EAJA. 
 
Guzman-Andrade v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[D]o aliens denied temporary or permanent resident 
status by the INS under the [8 U.S.C. § 1255a] legalization program 
retain the right to judicial review of the denial after the 1996 
amendments to IRCA (the Immigration Reform and Control Act) by 
section 308(g)(2)(B) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)?” Id. at 1075. 
REFERENTIAL NOTE: (**Please be aware that, at present, the 
Legalization Appeals Unit (LAU) is now referred to as the 
Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU), and that the INS has been collapsed 
into the Department of Homeland Security. Due to the fact that the 
procedural history of this case implicates the LAU and the INS prior to 
the dates when such changes were made, they are referred to in their 
earlier form**). Id. 
ANALYSIS: IIRIRA preserves judicial review of a § 1255a denial if 
the denial is in reference to a deportation proceeding but not if it is in 
reference to an exclusion proceeding. Id. at 1077. Because of the 
temporary resident status of the plaintiff in this case, the 9th Circuit 
concluded that there was no question that plaintiff “was lawfully within 
the United States at the time he filed his legalization application, and 
would therefore have been subject to deportation, rather than exclusion, 
proceedings prior to IIRIRA.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that it had “jurisdiction under § 
1255a(f)(4)(A) to review [plaintiff’s] legalization application.” Id. 
 
Jack Russell Terrier Network v. Am. Kennel Club, 407 F.3d 1027 (9th 
Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether “a national breed club and registry and several 
of its regional affiliates [are] capable of conspiring as separate entities 
under §1 of the Sherman Act” Id. at 1034. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit stated that the crucial question in such a 
case “is whether the entities alleged to have conspired maintain an 
‘economic unity,’ and whether the entities were either actual or potential 
competitors.” Id. The court first noted that the “objectives of the [club] 
and its regional affiliates are ‘common, not disparate.’” Id. at 1035. The 
court then went on to say that “the regional affiliates’ sole purpose are to 
be affiliated with the national club and to promote the [club’s] breed 
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standard and philosophy. In no way do the affiliates compete with the 
club.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Based on the fact that the club and its affiliates were 
not separate entities and were not in economic competition, the court 
ruled that they could not have entered into a conspiracy in violation of 
the Sherman Act. Id. at 1034-35. 
 
United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) 
requirement of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”), as specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), applies to coram 
nobis proceedings.” Id. at 1009.   
ANALYSIS: “‘[T]he writ [of coram nobis] provides a remedy for 
those suffering from the lingering collateral consequences of an 
unconstitutional or unlawful conviction based on errors of fact and 
egregious legal errors.’” Id. at 1009-10. Under § 2253(c)(1), “the grant of 
a COA [is] necessary in only two kinds of appeals: an appeal from ‘(A) 
the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention 
complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or (B) the 
final order in a proceeding under section 2255.’” Id. at 1010. The COA 
requirement serves a gate keeping function for the courts, but the 9th 
Circuit has noted that such functions are not necessary in “legitimate 
coram nobis cases . . . [because] few defendants who have already 
completely served their sentences continue to have reasons to challenge 
their conviction or sentence.” Id. at 1011. 
CONCLUSION: Because coram nobis cases are not within the 
language of § 2255, and because they do not affect the gate keeping 
function of the AEDPA, the COA requirement is inapplicable. Id. 
 
United States v. Kimbrew, 406 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the sentencing enhancement for being in 
the business of receiving and selling stolen property can apply to a 
defendant who sells only property that he himself has obtained by fraud.” 
Id. at 1150. 
ANALYSIS: “The [Federal Sentencing] Guidelines permit a two-
level enhancement ‘[i]f the offense involved receiving stolen property, 
and the defendant was a person in the business of receiving and selling 
stolen property.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4)). “However, 
nearly every circuit that has addressed the meaning of this enhancement 
has agreed ‘that a thief who sells goods that he himself has stolen is not 
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in the business of receiving and selling stolen property.’” Id. The 9th 
Circuit agreed with this reading of the enhancement provision, finding 
that it was meant to apply to fences (those who are in the business of 
receiving stolen merchandise from thieves) and not to the thieves 
themselves. Id. at 1153-54. 
CONCLUSION: Due to the fact that the defendant in this case was 
himself stealing the goods in question and not merely acting as a fence, 
the 9th Circuit found that the sentencing enhancement was inapplicable. 
Id. 
 
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 
F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the prerequisites set forth in Brook Group 
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. [509 U.S. 209 (1993)] for 
establishing liability in sell-side predatory pricing cases apply in cases 
where a defendant engages in buy-side predatory bidding by raising the 
cost of inputs.” Id. at 1035. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit began its analysis of the issue by 
explaining that Brook Group places a high burden on the plaintiff in a 
case alleging sell-side predatory pricing. Id. at 1036. The plaintiff must 
prove that “its competitor operated at a loss and was likely to recoup its 
losses.” Id. The 9th Circuit explained that the high burden of proof in 
sell-side predatory pricing is necessary because the lower prices that 
occur as a result of sell-side predatory pricing are a benefit to the 
consumer and often foster competition. Id. at 1037. The 9th Circuit then 
explained that there are no real short or long term benefits to consumers 
in buy-side predatory pricing, therefore, it is not necessary to have such a 
high burden of proof in buy-side cases. Id. at 1037-38. 
CONCLUSION: The prerequisites set forth in Brook Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. for establishing liability in sell-side 
predatory pricing cases do not apply in cases where a defendant engages 
in buy-side predatory bidding by raising the cost of inputs because the 
consumer will likely not benefit from the effects of buy-side predatory 
bidding. Id. at 1038.  Therefore, the high burden of proof in Brook Group 
is not needed. Id.  
 
Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether “a child of a parent who was forcibly 
sterilized is automatically eligible for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(B).” Id. at 1242. 
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ANALYSIS: In deciding this issue the court looked to a strict reading 
of the statute, which “does not plainly indicate that such children are 
deemed eligible.” Id. at 1245. The 9th Circuit explained that when the 
language is ambiguous the court should defer to the reasonable 
conclusion of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id. The court 
then evaluates the BIA’s conclusions that automatic eligibility does not 
apply to children of sterilized parents because these children are not 
necessarily persecuted as a result of the sterilization. Id. Unlike the 
spouse of a sterilized person, who is directly effected by the sterilization 
by not being able to have children with their spouse, the court finds that 
it is not unreasonable to conclude that children of a sterilized parent are 
not necessarily automatically persecuted as a result of the sterilization. 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: A child of a parent who was forcibly sterilized is not 
automatically eligible for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).  
However, the child is still able to bring a claim to show in their particular 
circumstances that they should be eligible for asylum. Id.  
 
United States v. Camacho, 413 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the double jeopardy analysis applies where a 
defendant has been previously disciplined through sanctions available to 
federal employer. Id. 
ANALYSIS: In this case, the government employer imposed 
sanctions upon the defendant for theft that the court reasoned were 
similar to sanctions that a private employer would impose. Id. at 989. 
The 9th Circuit stated that “[o]nly when disciplinary sanctions imposed 
by the government acting in its role as sovereign are the functional 
equivalent of criminal punishment is the double jeopardy bar 
implicated.” Id. at 989 n.9. The court recognized the policy reasons 
behind barring use of the double jeopardy clause when the government is 
the employer and recognized the problems inherent in the government’s 
dual nature. Id. at 990. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit fell in line with the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 
7th, and 11th Circuits in holding that “criminal prosecution for theft 
…does not violate his Fifth Amendment protection against double 
jeopardy. The discipline… is the type of discipline any private employer 
might have imposed on an employee. It did not rely on the government’s 
sovereign power and is thus outside the scope of double jeopardy 
concerns.” Id. at 991. 
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United States v. Pulliam, 405 F.3d 782 (9th. Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether a defendant may successfully move to 
suppress evidence found in a car in which he was a passenger where the 
car and its occupants were legally stopped but unlawfully detained.” Id. 
at 792. 
ANALYSIS: First, the court looked to vehicular stop caselaw as a 
framework.  Id. These cases held that a defendant who is not a bona fide 
owner of a vehicle may nonetheless contest the legality of his own 
incarceration and move to suppress evidence that was found in the 
automobile as the “fruit” of his incarceration. Id. The court noted that, 
but for the officer’s illegal detaining of the vehicle and passengers, the 
officers would not have found the evidence. Id. Therefore, the motion to 
suppress was correctly granted. Id. The court clarified that the stop of a 
vehicle and detention of the passengers can not be considered separate 
and independent events, but rather, the situation must be looked at as a 
whole in a “fruits” analysis. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned, a legal 
stop followed by an illegal incarceration must be considered a single, 
integrated instance and treated identically to an illegal stop in which a 
defendant can move to suppress the evidence. Id. at 793-94. The court 
also held, for purposes of standing to suppress, that passengers and 
drivers are considered the same as the owner of the vehicle and all have 
standing to move to suppress evidence. Id. at 795. Finally, the court 
emphasized the Supreme Court’s stance that “the way to ensure 
protections [against unconstitutional police activity] is to exclude 
evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high 
social cost of letting persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their 
crimes.” Id. (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)). 
CONCLUSION: The court ultimately held that a passenger of an 
automobile who is not the owner may successfully move to suppress 
evidence found in a car where the car and its occupants were legally 
stopped but unlawfully detained. Id.  
 
Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963, is a grant of authority to the federal courts to 
invalidate certain state court child custody proceedings that counteracts 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Id. at 1044. 
ANALYSIS: This case involved a conflict between the State of 
California’s right to terminate parental rights over Indian children and 
the ICWA, which “ensures the [Indian] tribes a role in adjudicating child 
custody proceedings involving Indian children domiciled or residing on 
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the [Indian] reservation.” Id. at 1039. However, ICWA is limited “where 
jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law.” Id. 
First, the 9th Circuit determined that this matter fell “within the 
traditional boundaries of the Rooker-Feldman” doctrine. Id. at 1043. The 
Rocker-Feldman doctrine states that “a federal district court is without 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a state 
court.” Id. at 1041. However, the court pointed out that Section 1914 of 
the ICWA states that “any Indian child who is the subject of any action 
for foster case placement or termination of parental rights under State 
law, any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody was removed, 
and the Indian child’s tribe may petition any court of competent 
jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action 
violated any protection of sections 101 [§1911] ,102 [§1912], and 103 
[§1913] of this Act.” Id. at 1044. Nonetheless, ICWA does not confer 
jurisdiction upon the federal courts. Id. at 1045. Thus, the 9th Circuit 
used 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in combination with the ICWA to establish 
federal jurisdiction. Id. at 1045-47. 
Second, the 9th Circuit applied the facts of this case to Section 
1914 of the ICWA and determined that the facts fell within the 
boundaries of the statute. Id. at 1048. The court demonstrated that the 
California law involved here, Public Law 280, is one that is adjudicatory 
and not regulatory. Id. at 1061. Therefore, the California law for custody 
proceedings fits within the legislative intent of the ICWA. Id. at 1064. 
CONCLUSION: California’s Public Law 280 creates “concurrent 
jurisdiction over dependency proceedings involving Indian children.” Id. 
at 1068. Therefore, ICWA applies and the federal court has jurisdiction 
in regards to this matter. Id. 
 
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 417 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether § 106 [of the National Historic Preservation 
Act (“NHPA”), currently codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470f,] provides a 
private right of action against the United States . . . .”  Id. at 1093. 
ANALYSIS: The San Carlos Apache Tribe in Arizona sought an 
injunction against the United States to maintain certain water levels in 
the San Carlos Reservoir, thus avoiding proceeding against the federal 
government under the Administrative Procedure Act ( “APA”).  Id. at 
1092.  Instead, the Tribe contended that a private right of action existed 
under the NHPA that allowed it to forego proceeding administratively 
first.  Id. at 1093.  The 9th Circuit noted that it had previously “assumed” 
without deciding that the NHPA did grant a private right of action.  Id. at 
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1094.  The court looked to the recent Supreme Court decision of 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), which held, under a 
similarly situated Civil Rights statute, that Congress must explicitly grant 
a private right of action to proceed against the federal government and 
that no such implication can be inferred.  Id. at 1094-95.  The 9th Circuit 
reasoned that the APA provides the alternate means by which a private 
party can ensure that government officials abide by a statute and thus a 
private right of action is not necessary.  Id. at 1099. 
CONCLUSION: Section 106 of the NHPA does not provide a private 
right of action against the United States.  Id. 
 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
Ansari v. Qwest Commc’ns Corp., 414 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) . . . 
prohibited the Colorado district court from compelling arbitration in 
Colorado when the parties’ contractual agreement designated 
Washington, D.C. as the arbitration forum.” Id. at 1215. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that circuit courts are split, taking one 
of three basic approaches to resolve this issue. Id. at 1218. The court 
explained that the 5th Circuit “has held that a district court may compel 
arbitration in the district specified in the arbitration agreement, even 
though that district is outside its own district.” Id. The court further 
pointed to a second approach, adopted by the 9th Circuit, allowing “the 
district court to compel arbitration in its own district and ignore the 
forum specified in the arbitration clause.” Id. at 1219. The court 
ultimately adopted the majority approach holding that “where the parties 
agreed to arbitrate in a particular forum only a district court in that forum 
has authority to compel arbitration under § 4.” Id. at 1219-20. The court 
found the third approach correct because “any other result renders 
meaningless the § 4 mandate that arbitration and the order compelling 
arbitration issue from the same district.” Id. at 1220. 
CONCLUSION: The court “conclude[d] that § 4 did prohibit the 
district court from compelling arbitration in either Colorado or 
Washington, D.C.” Id. at 1215. 
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Claymore v. United States, 415 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether sovereign immunity bars an award of 
monetary damages against the government in a Rule 41(e) action when 
the property cannot be returned.” Id. at 1118. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit acknowledged that there is a split 
among the circuits with regard to this question. Id. While the 2nd and 9th 
Circuits have allowed monetary damages in such a situation, the 3rd, 4th, 
5th, 8th and 11th Circuits have not allowed damages when the property 
has been destroyed. Id. The 10th Circuit, like a majority of other circuits 
that have faced the issue held that “because Rule 41(e) does not contain 
the explicit waiver of sovereign immunity required to authorize monetary 
relief against the government, [it] deprives a court of jurisdiction to 
award damages” when the property has been destroyed. Id. at 1118-19. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit “agree[d] with the majority of the 
circuits and conclude[d] [that] sovereign immunity bars monetary relief 
in a Rule 41(e) proceeding when the government no longer possesses the 
property.” Id. at 1120. 
 
United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a jury, after Apprendi and Booker, must 
determine the amount and type of drug attributable to individual 
coconspirators rather than simply attributable to the entire conspiracy.” 
Id. at 1193. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit stated that, under Apprendi, “‘[o]ther 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for 
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 1192 (quoting 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). However, Apprendi also only sets 
the “‘maximum sentence ([i.e., the] ceiling)’ under which each 
coconspirator’s sentence must fall,” and “in the conspiracy context, a 
finding of drug amounts for the conspiracy as a whole sets the maximum 
sentence that each coconspirator [can] be given.” Id. at 1192-93. The 
10th Circuit reasoned that “the sentence falls within the statutory 
maximum made applicable by the jury’s conspiracy-wide drug quantity 
determination,” and that Booker “does not call [the present sentencing] 
into question.” Id.  
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit found that the “the jury is not 
required to make individualized findings as to each coconspirator 
because ‘[t]he sentencing judge’s findings do not, because they cannot, 
have the effect of increasing an individual defendant’s exposure beyond 
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the statutory maximum justified by the jury’s guilty verdict.’” Id. at 
1193. 
 
San Juan County v. United States, 420 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether an intervenor must establish its own Article 
III standing as a matter of right. Id. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit began by noting that “because 
standing implicates a court’s jurisdiction, it requires a court itself to raise 
and address standing before reaching the merits of the case before it.” Id. 
at 1205. “Nevertheless, on many occasions the Supreme Court has noted 
that an intervenor may not have standing, but has not specifically 
resolved that issue, so long as another party to the litigation had 
sufficient standing to assert the claim at issue.” Id. For the above reasons, 
the court concluded that a party seeking to intervene under FED. R. CIV. 
P. 24 “need not establish its own standing, in addition to meeting Rule 
24’s requirements, before the party can intervene so long as another party 
with constitutional standing on the same side as the intervenor remains in 
the case.” Id. at 1206. 
CONCLUSION: “[I]ntervenors do not need to establish their own 
Article III standing in order to intervene as a matter of right under FED. 
R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).” Id. at 1205. 
 
Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the removal provisions of the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 [“CAFA”] . . . apply to pending state court cases 
that were removed after the effective date of the Act.” Id. at 1090. 
ANALYSIS: The plain language of the statute provides that CAFA 
applies to civil actions that began on or after the date of CAFA’s 
enactment, February 18, 2005. Id. at 1094. The underlying case at bar 
was commenced in state court on April 2, 2003. Id. The 10th Circuit 
stated that jurisdictional statues “and particularly removal statutes, are to 
be narrowly construed in light of our constitutional role as limited 
tribunals.” Id. at 1094-95. Further, “Congress initially started out with 
broader language that could have included a number of then-pending 
lawsuits in state courts. [But b]y excising the House provision, Congress 
signaled an intent to narrow the removal provisions of the Act to exclude 
currently pending suits.” Id. at 1095. 
CONCLUSION: The court did “not have jurisdiction over this appeal 
predicated on the Class Action Fairness Act because this action was 
commenced prior to the effective date of the Act.” Id. at 1093-94. 
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United States v. Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Under the Fourth Amendment, whether an arrest 
“immediately terminate[s] a search provision in a parole or probation 
agreement.” Id. at 1242. 
ANALYSIS: The government has a continuing interest in monitoring 
parolees, in order to prevent recidivism, and this interest is not subsumed 
by an arrest. Id. at 1242-43.  The appellant was “incorrect to assert that 
the government’s interests [in crime prevention] evaporated at the 
moment of his arrest.” Id. at 1244. Finally, “a proper weighing of the 
government’s interests in effective supervision and prevention of harm 
against [the appellant’s] privacy interests demonstrates that his arrest has 
little effect on the calculus. Just as before his arrest, this balance weighs 
in favor of the government . . .” Id. 
CONCLUSION: In a parole or probation agreement, arrest does not 
cancel a search provision. Id. at 1244. 
 
In re Alderete, 412 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a Bankruptcy Court has “the power to grant a 
partial discharge of student loan debts even in the absence of an undue 
hardship.” Id. at 1207. 
ANALYSIS: Bankruptcy Courts derive their equitable powers from § 
105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code which grants the power to “carry out the 
provisions of this title.” Id. at 1207. The 10th Circuit referred to the 
decisions of the 6th, 11th, and 9th Circuits to find that partial discharge 
of debt cannot be granted where the terms of the specific provision have 
not been met, in this case requiring a showing of undue hardship under § 
523(a)(8). Id. at 1207. 
CONCLUSION: “A bankruptcy court cannot exercise its § 105(a) 
powers to grant a partial discharge of student loans unless § 523(a)(8) 
has been satisfied.” Id. at 1207. 
 
McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a 
motion to compel arbitration divests a district court of jurisdiction to 
proceed on the merits of the underlying claim while the appeal is pending 
. . . .” Id. at 1160. 
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ANALYSIS: The court turned to the analysis undertaken by the other 
circuit courts that seem to be divided on the issue of whether to grant a 
stay pending an appeal from an arbitration dispute. Id. at 1160. The 10th 
Circuit aligned itself with the views of the 11th and 7th Circuits which 
held that “upon the filing of a non-frivolous § 16(a) appeal, the district 
court is divested of jurisdiction until the appeal is resolved on the 
merits.” Id. The court also reasoned that jurisdiction for frivolous appeals 
is meant to avoid “potential misuse of interlocutory review.” Id. at 1162. 
CONCLUSION: “[U]pon the filing of a motion to stay litigation 
pending an appeal from the denial of a motion . . . to compel arbitration, 
the district court may frustrate any litigant’s attempt to exploit the 
categorical divestiture rule by taking the affirmative step, after a hearing, 
of certifying the § 16(a) appeal as frivolous or forfeited.” Id.  
 
United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the district court followed the correct 
procedure, under the Supreme Court decision in Sell v. United States, 
539 U.S. 166 (2003), “for involuntary administration of antipsychotic 
medication to a non-dangerous criminal defendant for the purpose of 
rendering him competent to stand trial . . .” Id. at 1114. 
ANALYSIS: On appeal, the 10th Circuit analyzed the factual and 
legal findings of the district court to determine whether the 
administration of drugs was medically appropriate. Id. at 1114. Bradley 
argued that the government did not prove it had established no less 
intrusive treatment for his condition, but the 10th Circuit disagreed and 
found that no other treatment would “achieve substantially the same 
results.” Id. at 1115. The 10th Circuit also determined that the 
government has important interest in bringing criminals before the 
courts. Id. at 1116. 
CONCLUSION: Under Sell, a district court can order involuntary 
medication of a defendant in order to make him competent to stand trial 
if the court properly applied the factors defined by the Supreme Court. 
Id. at 1117. 
 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Brown v. McFadden, 416 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether, under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2005), a 
federal prisoner is entitled to receive credit toward the service of his 
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sentence, beyond the time served, of “fifty-four days . . . for each year he 
is sentenced to imprisonment” or whether the credit attaches “for each 
year [the prisoner] actually serves in prison.” Id. at 1272. (emphasis in 
original) 
ANALYSIS: The court decided that the district court’s determination 
that § 3624(b)(1) “clearly supports” the interpretation that the fifty-four 
days of credit attach for each year the prisoner serves in prison “is 
arguably correct.” Id. However, the court chose to follow the holdings of 
the five sister circuits addressing this issue, holding the provision is 
ambiguous but the interpretation proffered by the district court is a 
reasonable one. Id. at 1273. 
CONCLUSION: § 3624(b)(1) entitles a federal prisoner to fifty-four 
days of credit for each year he serves his prison sentence. Id. at 1272. 
 
McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3)(2005) “applies not 
only to exhaustion, but also to a procedural bar that arises out of a failure 
to exhaust.” Id. at 1305. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that a procedural bar arises when 
the plaintiff does not properly exhaust his state remedies prior to filing a 
habeas corpus petition. Id. at 1306.  The court noted that § 2254(b)(3) 
speaks about exhaustion and not about procedural bars, providing that 
“the [s]tate can waive [the plaintiff’s] failure to properly exhaust his 
claim only by expressly doing so . . . .” Id. at 1305. However, the court 
opined that when a procedural bar occurs because of the plaintiff’s 
failure to exhaust his state remedies, § 2254(b)(3) applies, mandating that 
the state can waive the procedural bar only if it expressly chooses to. Id. 
CONCLUSION: Section 2254(b)(3)’s express waiver requirement 
applies to procedural bars arising from plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his 
state court remedies. Id. at 1306. 
 
In re Martinez, 416 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the bankruptcy court properly awarded 
attorney’s fees and costs to a “prevailing [commercial] debtor in a 
dischargeability action brought by his creditor . . .” Id. at 1288. 
ANALYSIS: The court pointed out that a prevailing litigant in a 
federal bankruptcy litigation can only get attorney’s fees if a federal 
statute or a contract provides for such an award. Id. Here, the parties’ 
contract provided that it was governed by Florida law. Id. The contract 
further provided that the creditor is entitled to attorney’s fees if he brings 
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suit to enforce the contract. Id. The court recognized this provision was 
one sided and referred to a Florida law providing that such a provision 
must be construed to afford all parties to the contract a right to collect 
attorney’s fees where they must bring suit to enforce the contract. Id. at 
1288-89. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “a prevailing debtor in a 
dischargeability action brought by his creditor can recover his attorney’s 
fees and costs incurred in those dischargeability proceedings if recovery 
of such are due under an enforceable contractual right, such as a statutory 
reciprocal attorney’s fee provision, provided for by state law.” Id. at 
1288. 
 
Ortega v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 416 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether [the court has] jurisdiction to review an 
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals that determined the status of 
an alien under section 202 of the Nicaraguan and Central American 
Relief Act of 1997.” Id. at 1349. 
ANALYSIS: The court determined that § 202(f) of the Act “clearly 
shows that Congress intended to foreclose judicial review” of the 
Attorney General’s decision concerning whether an alien has or has not 
established that “his status should be adjusted under [the Act] . . .” Id. at 
1350. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that, “[b]ecause the clear language of 
section 202(f) restricts our jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 1349.   
 
Williams v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Edison Cmty. College, 421 F.3d 1190 
(11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a Florida community college, under the 
new education code enacted in January 2003, is an arm of the state, 
entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. at 1190. 
ANALYSIS: To determine whether a community college is an “arm 
of the state” the court looked at four factors: “(1) how the state defines 
the entity; (2) what degree of control the state maintains over the entity; 
(3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for 
judgment against the entity.” Id. at 1192. The court determined that, 
though a community college is an arm of the state, this did not “weigh 
heavily in [the] analysis.” Id. at 1193. The degree of control of the state 
over the community college did weigh heavily towards the college being 
an arm of the state, as did the source of funding and the state’s status as 
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judgment debtor for judgments entered against the college. Id. at 1193-
94. 
CONCLUSION: A Florida community college “is an arm of the state 
for purposes of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. at 1194. 
 
United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether prior juvenile adjudication may be considered 
for purposes of increasing appellee’s sentence under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Id. at 1188. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the sentencing factor of recidivism 
is arguably the most traditional basis for increasing an offender’s 
sentence. Id. The court looked at other circuits, the majority of which 
have held that when a juvenile is convicted and has received all process 
constitutionally due at the juvenile stage, no constitutional problem exists 
in using that prior adjudication for purposes of increasing a later 
sentence. Id. at 1189-90. The court next agreed that trial by jury is not a 
constitutional requisite in juvenile adjudications. Id. at 1190. Under this 
paradigm, the court held that the prior adjudication may be considered 
for purposes of increasing appellee’s sentence under the ACCA. Id. at 
1191. 
CONCLUSION: A juvenile adjudication may be a “prior conviction” 
under the ACCA where the defendant has been afforded all 
constitutionally-required process due in the juvenile adjudication. 
 
United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether Amendment 591 to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines provides a basis for reduction in sentence via a § 3553(a) 
motion. Id. at 1218-19. 
ANALYSIS: Pursuant to a motion under § 3553(a), a court may 
“reduce the term of imprisonment . . . to the extent [the factors contained 
in the provision] are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. 
at 1219 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). “Amendment 591 requires that 
the initial selection of the offense guideline be based only on the statute 
or offense of conviction rather than on judicial findings of actual conduct 
not made by the jury.” Id. Although the Amendment “directs the [courts] 
to apply the guideline dictated by the statute of conviction [it] does not 
constrain the use of judicially found facts to select a base offense level 
within the relevant guideline.” Id. at 1219-20. Agreeing with the 
reasoning of its sister circuits, the 11th Circuit held that Amendment 591 
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governs only the “selection of the relevant offense guideline, not the 
selection of a base offense level within the applicable offense guideline . 
. . .” Id. at 1220. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit ultimately concluded that 
“Amendment 591 only applies to the selection of the relevant offense 
guideline, not the selection of a base offense level within the applicable 
offense guideline . . . .” Id. at 1220. 
 
Kehoe v. Fidelity Fed. Bank & Trust, 421 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a plaintiff must prove actual damages 
before he may recover a liquidated damages award under the [Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”)].” Id. at 1212. 
ANALYSIS: The relevant sections of the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2722 
and 2724, make it “unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or 
disclose personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for [an 
unpermitted use.]” Id. at 1212. Turning first to the statutory text, the 
court determined that there was “no language in [the provision] that 
confines liquidated damages to people who suffered actual damages.” Id. 
at 1213. Therefore, “[s]ince liquidated damages are an appropriate 
substitute for the potentially uncertain and unmeasurable actual damages 
of a privacy violation, it follows that proof of actual damages is not 
necessary for an award of liquidated damages.” Id. The 11th Circuit then 
pointed to dicta where the Supreme Court suggests that “language similar 
to the language in the DPPA [does not create the] prerequisite [of 
showing actual damages] to recovering statutory damages.” Id. at 1214 
(citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004)). Finally, the 11th Circuit 
found that the district court’s application of the rule of the last antecedent 
–that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as 
modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows”—was 
erroneously applied to the provision at issue. Id. at 1215. (quoting 
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2004)).  
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit concluded that “[a] plaintiff need 
not prove actual damages to recover liquidated damages for a violation 
of the DPPA.” Id. at 1217. 
 
D’Angelo v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the [Americans with Disabilities Act]’s 
reasonable accommodation requirement applies to the regarded-as 
category of disabled individuals . . . .” Id. at 1235. 
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ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit found that because “a review of the 
plain language of the ADA yields no statutory basis for distinguishing 
among individuals who are disabled in the actual-impairment sense and 
those who are disabled only in the regarded-as sense,” the court would 
join the 3rd Circuit in “holding that regarded-as disabled individuals also 
are entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA.” Id. 
(emphasis in original). Finding that “[t]he text of the statute simply offers 
no basis for differentiating among the three types of disabilities in 
determining which are entitled to a reasonable accommodation and 
which are not” the court concluded that the “ADA’s plain language . . . 
compels [the court] to conclude that the very terms of the statute require 
employers to provide reasonable accommodations for individuals it 
regards as disabled.” Id. at 1236. Thus, “‘regarded-as’ employees under 
the ADA are entitled to reasonable accommodation in the same way as 
those who are actually disabled.” Id. at 1237. 
CONCLUSION: “Based on the text of this statute and the absence of 
any contrary expression of congressional intent, we hold that an 
individual falling within the ‘regarded as’ category of disability under the 
ADA is entitled to a reasonable accommodation no less than an 
individual satisfying the actual-impairment definition of disability.” Id. at 
1239. 
 
Coffman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the district court properly determined that the 
defendant was not liable to the plaintiff as a ‘successor in interest’ or 
‘successor employer’ and, therefore, owed no duty to reemploy the 
plaintiff [once he returned from active military duty] under 38 U.S.C. § 
4312 (2005) and 38 U.S.C. § 4313 (2005).” Id. at 1234. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by identifying the definition of 
“employer” as utilized by the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”). Id. at 1234. USERRA 
does not provide a definition for “successor in interest;” thus, the court 
looked to the legislative history and relevant case law for guidance. Id. at 
1236. The court gave credence to the factors listed by the 8th Circuit in 
Leib v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 925 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1991), but 
reasoned that they were only necessary when a merger or transfer of 
assets has taken place between the two subject companies. Id. The 
foundation of successor liability is the “merger or transfer of assets 
between the predecessor and successor companies.” Id. at 1237. Because 
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Del-Jen and the defendant had neither merged nor transferred assets, the 
defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff. Id. at 1239.   
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit ultimately concluded that the 
district court made the proper determination. Id. at 1239. The court held 
that the defendant was not a “successor in interest’ or “successor 
employer,” and therefore USERRA does not apply.  Id. at 1232. 
 
United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) should 
be classified as a crime of violence for the purpose of career offender 
classification . . . .” Id. at 1195. 
ANALYSIS: Searcy was convicted of using the internet to induce a 
minor into engaging in “unlawful sexual activity.” Id. at 1194. Searcy 
was classified as a career offender because of his history of violent 
crimes and claimed that his current conviction was not violent in nature. 
Id. at 1195. The 11th Circuit disagreed and defined a “crime of violence” 
as either a crime with an element of force, or a crime with the potential 
risk of injury. Id. Because statutory rape “inherently poses a serious 
potential risk of physical injury,” the 11th Circuit affirmed his status. Id. 
at 1196 (quoting United States v. Smith, 20 F. App’x. 412 (6th Cir. 
2002)). 
CONCLUSION: Convictions under § 2422(b) should be considered 
crimes of violence for sentencing purposes. Id. at 1198. 
 
Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (“PLRA”) 
exhaustion requirement requires simple exhaustion or proper exhaustion 
of administrative avenues before a prisoner may bring suit in court. Id. at 
1153-54. 
ANALYSIS: Johnson, a Georgia state prisoner, sued his prison in 
federal court without first following administrative procedure and his suit 
was dismissed. Id. at 1154. Johnson then filed a complaint which was 
denied for being untimely, and filed again in federal court. Id. The prison 
argued that Johnson’s suit was not allowed because he did not truly 
exhaust his administrative remedies since he did nothing until the federal 
court ordered it and did not appeal his administrative denial. Id. The 11th 
Circuit agreed and held that the exhaustion provision “mandates strict 
exhaustion” and that all prisoners must first exhaust all internal remedies 
before filing in court. Id. at 1155. The 11th Circuit further explained that 
any other decision would allow prisoners to “‘evade the exhaustion 
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requirement by filing no administrative grievance or by intentionally 
filing an untimely one . . .’” Id. at 1157. (citing Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 
707 (5th Cir. 1995)).   
CONCLUSION: The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement requires 
prisoners to fully exhaust all administrative remedies with good faith 
before being able to file a complaint in court. Id. at 1159. 
 
MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group, LLC, 420 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: When determining diversity jurisdiction, how does a 
court determine the “citizenship of a defendant corporation which once 
operated in the same state as the plaintiff but has since been purchased 
by and integrated into an out-of-state corporation as a holding 
company?” Id. at 1237. 
ANALYSIS: Plaintiff claimed that the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the matter because the parties were not in complete 
diversity with each other at the time the complaint was filed. Id. at 1239. 
Specifically, the defendant was an “inactive corporation” at the time of 
the suit, and plaintiff claimed that his citizenship remained the same as 
when the corporation was active. Id. at 1239. The court determined that 
its “total activities test” was appropriate for both active and inactive 
corporations, and looked at the principal place of business and nerve 
center to determine where citizenship existed at the time of the suit. Id. at 
1239. Because defendant was completely inactive in plaintiff’s 
jurisdiction at the time the suit was filed, but did business elsewhere, the 
court determined that it was not an “inactive corporation” as defined by 
other circuits. Id. at 1240. Thus, the Court observed that defendant’s 
place of business and nerve center were different than that of the 
plaintiff, and complete diversity did exist. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that its “total activities test” was the 
correct test to determine the citizenship of an “inactive corporation.” Id. 
at 1234. 
 
Robertson v. Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether there is a constitutionally-protected liberty 
interest in a mother’s continued relationship with her adult son, under 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. Id. at 1255. 
ANALYSIS: Reviewing plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for deprivation of 
alleged constitutional interests with respect to police causing the death of 
plaintiff’s son, the court noted that it was progressing into a “murky area 
of unenumerated constitutional rights.” Id. at 1256 (citing McCurdy v. 
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Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 2003)). The 1st, 3rd, 7th, and DC 
Circuits had rejected similar claims where the “deprivation was 
incidental to the defendant’s actions.” Id. at 1258. The 10th Circuit, 
referring to the First Amendment’s right of intimate association, had 
upheld a parent’s liberty interest with an adult son. Id. at 1258 n.3. Only 
the 9th Circuit had upheld “allowing a parent to bring a companionship 
claim in the context of an adult child where the deprivation was 
incidental to the state action.” Id. at 1258 n.4. The court rejected 
plaintiff’s claim that she had a constitutionally-protected liberty interest 
in her relationship with her adult son, finding no Supreme Court 
precedent and no reason to further expand protections under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1260. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit would not affirm a parent’s 
constitutional right to companionship with an adult son, in the context of 
a § 1983 claim. Id. at 1259. The court concluded it is up to the Florida 
legislature to determine whether said deprivations are allowable. Id. at 
1262. 
 
Siemens Power Trans’n. & Distrib., Inc. v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co., 420 
F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: (1) “[W]hether a shipper’s timely compliance with the 
minimum claim filing requirements in 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b), a 
regulation promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(“ICC”), is a prerequisite to filing suit against a carrier under the 
Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706. . . .” Id. at 1245. (2) If the 
timely compliance is a requirement, “what standard should be applied to 
determine whether a shipper has adhered to the regulation’s requirement 
that a claim contain ‘a specified or determinable’ amount of damages, 49 
C.F.R. § 1005.2(b).” Id. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that although it had not “expressly held 
the ICC minimum claim requirements apply to litigated claims,” in 
contrast with voluntarily settled claims, prior holdings had assumed as 
much. Id. at 1250. In reviewing how other circuits had treated this 
matter, the court determined that all but one circuit to address the issue 
had held the requirements to apply to litigated claims. Id. The 1st, 2nd, 
and 9th Circuits had held that the ICC regulations apply to contested and 
voluntarily settled claims; the 5th and 6th Circuits had applied the ICC 
regulations without explicitly holding on the issue; and the 7th Circuit 
had concluded that the ICC regulations only apply to the settled claims. 
Id. After reviewing the precedent from the other courts, the 11th Circuit 
was persuaded by the majority of circuits that 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b) did 
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govern plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 1251. The court further determined that an 
exact damages estimate was not needed for plaintiff, as long as the 
carrier had enough information to start processing the claim. Id. at 1253-
54. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit ultimately reversed the district 
court’s decision that the plaintiff did not have a valid claim. Id. at 1254. 
While affirming the holding that § 1005.2(b) applied to both litigated and 
settled matters, the court disagreed with the lower court’s determination 
that the plaintiff had not provided specified damages. Id. The Circuit 
construed the statute liberally to hold that the plaintiff’s claim met the 
requirements of “specified and determinable” damages because the 
damage estimates were in a narrow-enough range. Id.  
 
Centurion Air Cargo v. United Parcel Serv., 420 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: Whether an arbitrator’s order is binding, where the 
parties have not expressly agreed that said award is binding and where 
the district court has not yet affirmed the award. Id. at 1149. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that the “Supreme Court has 
declared a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration.” Id. at 1149. 
Hence, “[t]o adopt a rule that an arbitral decision is not ‘binding’ and 
thus lacks the authority of a conclusive judgment would run counter to 
this policy and require all winners in arbitrations to seek affirmation in a 
district court.” Id. at 1150. 
CONCLUSION: “[W]e agree with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits and 
hold that an arbitrator’s order is binding on the parties unless they 
expressly agree otherwise, and does not require affirmance from a court 
to take effect.” Id. at 1150. 
 
Young v. New Process Steel, 419 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “May a district court require, as a condition for 
appealing a judgment, that a losing plaintiff in a civil rights case post a 
Fed. R. App. P. 7 bond that includes the defendant’s anticipated appellate 
attorney’s fees?” Id. at 1202. 
ANALYSIS: The appellate court cited to Christiansburg v. Garment 
Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 
(1978) for the proposition that a “district court should not award 
attorney’s fees to a prevailing civil rights defendant absent ‘a finding that 
the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation.’” Id. at 1205. 
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CONCLUSION: “[W]e hold that a district court may not require an 
unsuccessful plaintiff in a civil rights case to post an appellate bond that 
includes not only ordinary costs but also the defendant’s anticipated 
attorney’s fees on appeal, unless the court determines that the appeal is 
likely to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id. at 1207-
08. 
 
London v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 410 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether “plaintiffs must show that the unfair, 
discriminatory or deceptive practice adversely affected competition in 
order to prevail under the [Packers and Stockyards Act] PSA.” Id. at 
1302. 
ANALYSIS: The Court stated that it must “‘interpret the words of 
the statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.” Id. 
(quoting Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake & 
Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 36 (1983)). The 11th Circuit stated that 
fair competition and fair trade were the primary purposes of the law and 
it was enacted out of a fear of a monopoly by packers. Id. at 1303. The 
11th Circuit cited to the 7th Circuit, which reasoned that there was no 
evidence that Congress sought to give a more expansive view of the 
PSA. Id. Furthermore, the 11th Circuit found that the holdings in the 4th 
and 8th Circuits, which state that an “unfair practice” requires an injury 
or likelihood of injury, to be persuasive. Id. In light of that Congressional 
intent, the Court found, along with the 4th, 7th, and 8th Circuits, that the 
actions in question must “adversely affect or be likely to adversely affect 
competition.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “In order to prevail under the PSA, a plaintiff must 
show that the defendant’s deceptive or unfair practice adversely affects 
competition or is likely to adversely affect competition.” Id. at 1304. 
 
United States v. Phillips, 413 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a prior conviction for the attempted sale of 
a controlled substance qualifies as a drug trafficking offense under 
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)” and whether deportation terminates 
outstanding parole. Id. at 1288. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit looked to the statutory language and 
commentary of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) to decide whether the 
conviction for “attempted sale of a controlled substance” would be 
considered a drug trafficking offense. Id. at 1288. Defendant was given a 
sixteen-level sentencing enhancement on the theory that his offense was 
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within the purview of the drug trafficking statute. Id. at 1291. The court 
used the statute’s commentary “that an ‘attempt offense’ can qualify as a 
prior drug trafficking offense” and compared a similar holding from the 
9th Circuit. Id. at 1292. As for the issue of whether deportation 
terminates parole, the court noted the lack of case law supporting the 
defendant’s belief and pointed to the 1st Circuit’s rejection of the issue. 
Id. at 1292. 
CONCLUSION: A previous conviction for attempted sale of a 
controlled substance is a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. § 
2L1.2(b)(1)(A) and defendant’s deportation after his conviction did not 
terminate his parole. Id. at 1288-92. 
 
Offshore Marine Towing, Inc. v. MR23, 412 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether attorney’s fees may be awarded to a salvor in 
an in rem action for salvage.” Id. at 1256. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit examined the exceptions for the 
general rule that attorney’s fees are not awarded in admiralty cases. Id. 
The exceptions for an award of fees occur in cases where there was 
either bad faith, breach of warranty of workmanlike performance, and 
indemnity situations. Id. at 1256. These exceptions were not present in 
this case and the court evaluated the Blackwall factors that were 
enumerated by the Supreme Court to determine that attorney’s fees were 
not included as to the value or risk of salving the property. Id. at 1257. 
CONCLUSION: “Attorney’s fees may not be recovered in an in rem 
action to enforce a salvage lien.” Id. at 1258. 
